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Microgrids are a potential part of the future smart distribution grid with capability
of island operation, envisioned to support the goals of increased use of renewable and
distributed energy resources, active consumer participation and improved quality of
electricity supply in the future power systems. This thesis examines the implemen-
tation of protection systems for microgrids and distributed energy resources using
the IEC 61850 standard series. IEC 61850 is one of the core smart grid standards
originally developed for substation automation, but extended in its usage to many
areas including distributed energy resources.
The main objectives of this thesis are analysing the implementation of microgrid
protection, usage of IEC 61850 in distribution applications, and applicability of
Multipower test environment of VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland in re-
searching these subjects. A literature review of microgrid protection issues and
proposed protection schemes as well as an overview of the IEC 61850 standard
series and its extensions are presented. An adaptive protection scheme is imple-
mented in an example microgrid conﬁguration of the Multipower environment using
IEC 61850, and its correct operation veriﬁed during islanding and in the case of a
communication network failure. Finally, recommendations are given on the future
development and research topics of the Multipower environment, including integra-
tion of diﬀerent distributed energy resource units from other VTT research areas
such as fuel cells and electrical vehicles to the system, studying the usage of diﬀerent
networks for communication inside the environment and testing of harmonization
between IEC 61850 and other smart grid standards.
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Mikroverkot ovat osa tulevaisuuden älykästä sähköjakeluverkkoa, jotka tarvittaessa
pystyvät itsenäiseen saarekekäyttöön jakeluverkon häiriöiden aikana. Mikroverkot
tukevat tulevaisuuden energiajärjestelmän tavoitteita uusiutuvien ja hajautettujen
energiaratkaisujen käytön lisäämisessä, kuluttajien aktiivisessa osallistumisessa ja
sähkön toimitusvarmuuden ja laadun parantamisessa. Tämä diplomityö käsittelee
mikroverkkojen ja hajautettujen energiaratkaisujen IEC 61850 -standardisarjaan
pohjautuvien suojausjärjestelmien toteutusta. IEC 61850 on yksi merkittävim-
mistä älykkäiden sähköverkkojen tietoliikennestandardeista, jonka soveltamisaluetta
on laajennettu alkuperäisestä sähköasemien sisäisestä automaatiosta ja tietoliiken-
teestä monille uusille alueille kuten hajautettuun energiantuotantoon.
Työssä esitetään kirjallisuusselvitys mikroverkkojen suojauksen potentiaalisista on-
gelmista sekä mahdollisista suojaustavoista, tiivistelmä IEC 61850 -standardisarjan
rakenteesta, periaatteista, julkaistuista laajennoksista ja niiden käyttötarkoituk-
sista, sekä analysoidaan VTT:n Multipower-testiympäristön soveltuvuutta näiden
aihepiirien tutkimukseen. Multipower-ympäristön soveltuvuutta mikroverkkojen
suojauksen tutkimukseen testataan toteuttamalla IEC 61850 -pohjainen adaptii-
vinen suojausratkaisu testiverkossa. Suojausjärjestelmän oikea toiminta todetaan
saarekkeeseen siirtymisen aikana sekä tietoliikennehäiriön tapahtuessa. Multipower-
ympäristön tärkeimmiksi tulevaisuuden tutkimuskohteiksi suositellaan VTT:n mui-
den tutkimusalueiden kuten polttokennojen ja sähköautojen tutkimuslaitteiston liit-
tämistä ympäristöön, erilaisten tietoliikenneratkaisujen soveltuvuuden testausta tie-
donsiirtoon ympäristön sisällä ja tutkimusta IEC 61850 -standardin yhteensopivuu-
desta muiden älykkäiden sähköverkkojen standardien kanssa.
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11. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Modern society is completely dependent on an uninterrupted supply of electricity.
More and more attention is being paid to the security, reliability and quality of power
supply while at the same time climate goals are driving investments in new, renew-
able energy solutions. These new elements should be integrated to the power system
with minimum costs, maximum interoperability and compatibility with widely inte-
grated internal energy markets of areas like the European Union [1]. According to
the International Energy Agency (IEA), investments in renewable sources of energy
increased from $60 billion in 2000 to $250 billion in 2014. Over the period to 2035,
IEA estimates total investments in renewables to amount to $6 trillion and a further
$7 trillion being spent on transmission and distribution. [2]
While emerging economies have to deal with hugely growing electricity demand,
OECD countries are faced with aging infrastructure, wide deployment of distributed
energy resources (DER) and integration of often volatile or intermittent renewable
energy sources. To respond to these challenges, the existing electricity grids are being
developed from passive networks to active smart grids. The European Technology
Platform of Smart Grids deﬁnes smart grid as "an electricity network that can intel-
ligently integrate the actions of all users connected to it - generators, consumers and
those that do both - in order to eﬃciently deliver sustainable, economic and secure
electricity supplies." [3] European smart grid projects launched from 2002 up to 2014
totalled $3.15 billion in investments across 459 projects [4]. The biggest changes are
happening at the distribution level, where integration of distributed generation, en-
abling of local energy demand management and smart metering, and adoptation of
technologies from transmission grids are creating a whole new set of requirements
for the power system and especially the communication system associated with it.
One of the promising smart grid concepts in achieving the aforementioned goals is to
take a system approach which views local generation and associated loads as a sub-
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system or a microgrid. A microgrid can be deﬁned as "a part of smart distribution
grid with an island operation capability" [5], i.e. if needed it can operate indepen-
dently without utility network connection. Microgrids are envisioned to be viewed
from the outside as a single controllable entity, and be able to support the goals of
future power systems in many possible ways. These include for example realizing an
energy-independent area, a platform for sharing energy resources between owners,
oﬀering support for utility networks during normal operation or fault situations, or
oﬀering aggregated demand response capabilities for balancing purposes of market
operators or electricity producers among others.
The protection of electricity networks is a foundational part of safe usage and op-
eration of the power system. With these new concepts, the traditional control and
protection systems face new challenges that need to be addressed in order to real-
ize the vision of future power systems. Distributed and power electronic interfaced
generation, diﬀering characteristics of distribution and transmission networks and
islanded use of microgrids all pose issues that must be considered in the protection
systems of these new structures.
These developments also raise the need for standardization to manage the increas-
ing number of interconnected systems and entities operating in the power system
domain. Standardization of smart grids is a key component in achieving the goal
of interoperability internally in systems with a wide variety of functions as well as
between them for the large-scale integration of energy systems. The International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), a leading international electrical standards de-
velopment organization, published the IEC Smart Grid Standardization Roadmap
in 2010 [6] for coordination of its standardization work. In this roadmap a num-
ber of core standards are deﬁned, with special relevancy to nearly all smart grid
applications. One of these core standards deﬁning the smart grid communication
systems is the IEC 61850 standard family "Communication Networks and Systems
for Power Utility Automation". With important application areas starting from the
original scope of substation automation to new application areas like hydro power
and distributed energy resources, the standard is designed to adopt state-of-the-art
protocols and provide also guidance in areas like engineering and maintenance. The
IEC 61850 is therefore also an integral part of modern distribution grid applications,
and a focus point in a lot of research related to the ﬁeld.
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1.2 Scope and structure of the thesis
This thesis has been written for the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland
in association with the installation of a new IEC 61850 -based control and protec-
tion system for the Multipower test environment for distributed energy resources in
Espoo, Finland. The main objectives and research questions are:
• How can the protection of microgrids be implemented using IEC 61850?
• How widely can IEC 61850 be applied in distribution applications, what is the
current state of the standard and what is being developed?
• How applicable is the Multipower laboratory environment in researching these
subjects and what should be developed?
The new installations as well as the envisioned future state and usage of the test
environment as a standard-based, multifunctional and ﬂexible testbed are the de-
ciding factors for the scope of this thesis. The chosen approach to the wide topic
of microgrids and distributed energy resources is from a technical requirement and
capability aspect, and more speciﬁcally as relevant to the widening scope of the
IEC 61850 standard series. Solutions and concepts based on communication are of
speciﬁc interest, since in these solutions IEC 61850 has the most relevance. The
chosen point of view is also guided by the approach of the standard series: instead
of examining ownerships, market participants or operators, the area of interest is in
the operation and communication between devices in realizing wanted power system
functions, with focus on protection systems. Business mechanisms, energy market
participation models and detailed economical cost-beneﬁt analyses of diﬀerent solu-
tions, while vitally important to real world microgrids, are not covered by IEC 61850
and therefore are not the focus of this thesis.
In the next section, the focus of this work is presented in context of the European
Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM) framework. In Chapter 2, the general
structure and properties of microgrids are examined, as well as principles for suc-
cessful islanding and resynchronization to the utility grid. In Chapter 3, protection
issues of microgrids as well as proposed solutions are reviewed, with a special focus
on adaptive protection. Chapter 4 presents an overview of the IEC 61850 standard
series, its information model and information exchange mechanisms, as well as its
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usage in DER applications. In Chapter 5 the Multipower test environment is in-
troduced, and a simple test conﬁguration is used to prove the adaptive protection
capabilities of the new protection and control system installed. Finally, conclusions
are presented in Chapter 6.
1.3 Relation to the Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM)
In March 2011, the European Commission issued the M\490 mandate for Smart
Grid standardization [7]. One of the key deliverables mentioned in the mandate
was "A technical reference architecture, which will represent the functional informa-
tion data ﬂows between the main domains and integrate many systems and subsys-
tems architectures." To fulﬁll this requirement the Reference Architecture Working
Group (SG-CG/RA) was formed under the Smart Grid Coordination Group (SG-
CG) established by the European standardization organizations CEN, CENELEC
and ETSI. The reference architecture is presented in the form of a technical report
[8], and consists of four main components: the European Conceptual Model, the
Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM) Framework, Architecture Viewpoints and
SGAM Methodology. The European Conceptual Model is an evolution of the NIST
Smart Grid Conceptual Model presented in [9] with EU speciﬁc requirements, most
important being the integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DER). It acts as
an overall high-level model that describes the main actors of the Smart Grid and
their main interactions, while the SGAM framework along with the diﬀerent view-
points allow various levels of description of desired smart grid aspects from top-level
to more detailed views. The SGAM methodology describes using the SGAM Frame-
work in assessing smart grid use cases and how they are supported by standards,
allowing standards gap analysis.
The SGAM Framework is a three dimensional model consisting of deﬁned interoper-
ability layers on top of the Smart Grid Plane divided to ﬁve domains and six zones,
as seen in Figure 1.1. With these components, the SGAM framework aims to pro-
vide a mapping and design tool for smart grid use cases, architectures and entities
ensuring all necessary levels of interoperability and information management hierar-
chy in all relevant smart grid domains are covered. The diﬀerent domains describe
the physical electrical energy conversion chain and include
1. Generation, including both conventional and renewable bulk generation
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2. Transmission, including infrastructure for transporting electricity over long
distances
3. Distribution, including infrastructure for the distribution of energy to cus-
tomers
4. DER, including distributed energy resources connected directly to the public
distribution grid
5. Customer Premises, including both end users and producers of electricity in
industrial, commercial and home facilities.
Figure 1.1 SGAM Framework [8]
Zones on the other hand represent the diﬀerent hierarchical levels of power system
management and are based on the concepts of aggregation and functional separation.
Deﬁned zones are
1. Process, consisting of transformation and movement of energy and the physical
power system equipment directly involved
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2. Field, consisting of the secondary process equipment used to protect, control
and monitor the primary power system process
3. Station, consisting of the areal aggregation of ﬁeld level data and functions
4. Operation, consisting of the overall power system control operation in the
respective domain
5. Enterprise, consisting of the commercial and organizational processes, services
and infrastructures of involved enterprises
6. Market, consisting of the market operations possible along the energy conver-
sion chain spanning several organizations.
Interoperability is seen as a key enabler of smart grid. It is described in [8] as
"the ability of two or more devices from the same vendor, or diﬀerent vendors, to
exchange information and use that information for correct cooperation". Interoper-
ability requirements in SGAM are grouped into ﬁve layers. Inspecting and deﬁning
interoperable functionality in all layers is meant to ensure compatibility in all levels
of system interactions.
1. Business Layer represents the economic and regulatory structures and policies
as well as business models, capabilites and processes of the smart grid actors
involved.
2. Function Layer describes functions, services and their relationships indepen-
dent from actors or physical implementations.
3. Information Layer describes the information being used and exchanged be-
tween functions, services and components, as well as the underlying data mod-
els for this information.
4. Communication Layer describes the protocols and mechanisms used for the
exchange of information deﬁned in the information layer.
5. Component Layer includes the physical components, actors and applications
participating in the selected functionality.
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As stated in the previous section the scope of this thesis is limited to microgrid en-
vironments and distributed energy resources, with speciﬁc focus on the IEC 61850
standard series. In Figure 1.2, this scope is presented as relevant areas of the SGAM
framework. Microgrids as a part of the future smart distribution system cover the
domains of Distribution, DER and Customer premises, in a very interconnected
way. While market participation and regulatory framework of operation are very
important questions in the realization of microgrids, this thesis focuses on the tech-
nical aspects as related to the control and protection of these systems. Therefore
the zones of interest include Process, Field, Station, Operation and to some extent
technical systems at the Enterprise zone, but largely exclude the commercial and or-
ganizational processes at the Market zone. All of the deﬁned interoperability layers
are relevant to the chosen focus. Although the wide questions of business models,
policies, and regulatory structures examined at the Business Layer fall outside the
scope of this thesis, the objectives, requirements and needs for the functions at the
Function layer are determined at the Business layer. Function, Information and
Communication Layers are all associated with IEC 61850, and Component Layer
is naturally of signiﬁcance when implementing real systems such as the Multipower
test environment presented in Chapter 5.
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Figure 1.2 Scope of the thesis in the SGAM framework.
92. CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF
MICROGRIDS
2.1 Microgrid structure and properties
Microgrid as a term does not have a single strict deﬁnition that is used and accepted
everywhere. Lasseter described the MicroGrid concept in 2002 as "a cluster of loads
and microsources operating as a single controllable system that provides both power
and heat to its local area" that could be thought as a controlled cell of the power
system [10]. The European Technology Platform SmartGrids deﬁned microgrids in
2006 as low-voltage networks with distributed generation (DG) sources, local stor-
age devices and controllable loads that have the ability to operate in islanded mode
when needed in addition to while being connected to the distribution network [11].
Laaksonen raises this ability as the key property of the microgrid, with a general
deﬁnition of "a part of smart distribution grid with an island operation capabil-
ity" [5]. This deﬁnition has been chosen for this thesis since island operation is
a unique property of microgrids compared to modern active distribution networks,
which otherwise can share many of the same properties.
Microgrids aren't necessarily restricted to the low-voltage (LV) level either, but
can consist of a medium-voltage (MV) feeder or even all MV feeders of a high-
voltage/medium-voltage (HV/MV) substation. [5, 12] They are seen as a major
building block in the distribution system of the future, with potential beneﬁts in-
cluding enhanced local reliability, improved energy eﬃciency and power quality, and
reduced distribution network losses and capacity requirements among others [5, 13,
14]. In this section the main components and structure of microgrids is presented,
along with the special properties they give to grid operation and control compared
to conventional distribution systems.
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2.1.1 Main components
Although microgrids can take several forms with varying sizes and locations in the
electrical system, the main components forming the microgrid remain largely the
same. First of all a combination of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) is integral
to the functioning of a microgrid. They are small sources of energy located at or near
the point of use. This can mean either distributed generation (DG) units, distributed
storage (DS) systems, or a hybrid combination of both. Typical DG technologies
include photovoltaics (PV), wind power, fuel cells, microturbines and reciprocating
internal combustion engines with generators. Some of these technologies like micro-
turbines or fuel cells can provide combined heat and power (CHP) which increases
their overall eﬃciency. Most of the technologies used connect to the grid via a power
electronic interface, consisting of either a DC/AC inverter or an AC/DC rectiﬁer
and a DC/AC inverter. [15] These converters can provide an additional layer of con-
trol and protection to the unit [16]. In addition to DER units, demand response
(DR) technologies, also referred to as demand side integration (DSI) or demand side
management (DSM), can provide additional ﬂexibility to the microgrid by providing
controllable or dispatchable loads in exchange for remuneration to the customer.
Second, the physical network connecting DER and customer loads to each other as
well as to the utility grid is needed. Three basic topologies of the grid include radial,
ring and mesh conﬁgurations, as shown in Figure 2.1. The structural topology
of the network may diﬀer from the topology actually used during operation, as
discussed below. The connection point between the microgrid and utility network,
often referred to as the point of common coupling (PCC), is of speciﬁc interest since it
connects the microgrid to the rest of the distribution network. PCC is the boundary
where a microgrid can be isolated if needed, usually located downstream of the utility
transformer. It can also be seen as the limit where control responsibility moves from
the utility to the microgrid owner. The technical details of measurements, control
and protection needed at the PCC will be discussed in Sections 2.2.2 and 3.1.2.
Radial conﬁguration is the simplest topology, consisting of one main line (or multiple
parallel lines) with loads and DER units connected to the main line as branches. This
simpliﬁes the technical implementation of protection and control of the microgrid.
It is even possible to connect the DER units close to the transformer and keep the
power and current ﬂows in one direction in all scenarios, keeping the control and
protection located in the substation. Radial topology is the most common structure
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Figure 2.1 Diﬀerent grid topologies from top to bottom: radial, ring and meshed networks.
in the current grid, especially in rural areas. Operation-wise distribution networks,
with the exception of very few cases in MV networks, are operated radially, even
if the actual structural topology is a ring or meshed network. It is also the only
topology applicable to LV networks where fuse protection is currently the primary
protection equipment, therefore not necessarily requiring new expensive components.
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Ring conﬁguration consists of lines creating a geometrical loop or ring shape, thus
enabling two alternative routes for power ﬂow to any given point of the network.
This oﬀers better voltage stability and lower power losses, but also requires a more
sophisticated protection system [12]. Ring topology is currently a common network
structure in residential areas, but because of the complicated protection needed, it
is operated as a radial grid by keeping one disconnector of the ring always open,
forming two parallel radial lines. This achieves maximum selectivity by allowing
the isolation of a faulty network segment and restoration of supply to all customers
behind the faulty area, while maintaining system simplicity.
Mesh conﬁguration further increases redundancy by oﬀering multiple alternative
connections to all network nodes. It provides the most ﬂexibility, but also makes
operation and protection of the microgrid challenging. Additional power lines and
breaker equipment also make mesh conﬁgurations the most expensive option. As
with ring topology, only some of the possible network conﬁgurations might be
used. [12]
DER penetration and its passive tolerance in the grid do not alone fulﬁll the charac-
teristics of a microgrid [17]. The third main component of a microgrid is an advanced
control and monitoring system that provides active supervision, control and opti-
mization inside the grid. A microgrid operator serves multiple economic, technical
and environmental aims: it is an aggregator of small generators, a network service
provider, a load controller and an emission regulator at the same time. Capability
of handling conﬂicting interests of diﬀerent stakeholders and arriving at an optimal
operation decision is an important characteristic of microgrid control. [13] The mi-
crogrid management system can be seen as a transition of distribution management
system (DMS) functionality to the lower levels of the distribution network, and
could be responsible for these lower level operations in the hierarchical management
of future smart distribution networks [5]. A conceptual structure of a microgrid
management system is presented in Figure 2.2. Each DER unit, in addition to
having advanced electronic metering capabilities, is equipped with a microsource
controller (MC). The MC is an intelligent electronic device (IED) responsible for
controlling and monitoring the DER unit, and can be a separate device or a soft-
ware implementation in either the DER power electronic interface or the metering
unit. Additionally, demand side integration is realized by load controllers (LC) at
the customer's point of connection to the grid.
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Figure 2.2 Typical microgrid management system [13].
The microgrid central controller (MGCC) acts as the coordinator of the microgrid as
well as the main interface between the microgrid and other related actors. Among
the most important are the local Distribution System Operator (DSO), possible
third party aggregators and the energy markets. The DSO controls the MV side
circuit breakers and disconnectors, receives measurements from the MV/LV trans-
former and may have IEDs communicating with the MGCC or microgrid IED at the
PCC regarding protection, islanding and resynchronization between the microgrid
and the utility network. The meter data management system (MDMS) of the DSO
collects data from the AMR meters of the microgrid, forwards alarms and relevant
measurements to the DMS and correspondingly requests from DMS to the AMR
meters. Third party aggregators can act as coordinators and market operators com-
bining the microgrid resources and oﬀering them to energy markets or as ancillary
services. These functionalities can be achieved through a home or building energy
management system (HEMS/BEMS), which aggregates data of single DER units
and loads, communicates with higher level systems and optimizes local energy use
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through resource allocation according to diﬀerent microgrid stakeholders' needs.
Distribution of functions and control between the MCs and the MGCC can vary
according to the selected control architecture. The main types include centralized,
decentralized and distributed control. In centralized control the MGCC takes the
main role in the overall optimization of the operations and value of the microgrid,
taking into account market prices, grid limitations or service requests from outside
the microgrid, and sending control signals to the microsources and controllable loads
of the microgrid. Monitoring of the actual active and reactive power of the sources
and loads is necessary in order to ensure correct operation. In fully decentralized
control, the MCs are given the main responsibility of optimizing their own pro-
duction according to local demand and market prices. Certain functions are still
centralized, such as load and generation forecasts and security monitoring, but the
DER units operate autonomously within given limits without explicit control signals
from other sources. Decentralized control is visioned to need only modest commu-
nication capabilities compared to a centralized solution, at the cost of local instead
of global optimization. Distributed control diﬀers from decentralized architecture
in that local controllers communicate with each other in order to form a view of
the overall system state that is used on making control decisions. This can include
technologies like agent-based control, in which control is achieved through indepen-
dent, intelligent agents (like inverters, DGs or loads) and negotiation between them,
following the multi-agent system (MAS) theory [18]. Truly distributed systems are
however hard to realize in practice without some party acting as a coordinating unit,
especially if network state estimation or optimal power ﬂow calculations are needed.
In [13], Hatziargyriou recognizes centralized architecture to be applicable in a case
where the microgrid is owned by a single entity with a clear goal such as an industry
owner trying to minimize operating costs, while decentralized solutions are seen
to work best in the case of multiple owners of DG units with diverse needs and
goals, like diﬀerent households in a microgrid operated in a market environment.
However, in [5] Laaksonen has compiled numerous issues from the grid perspective
associated with microgrid concepts without one grid-forming master unit and other
grid-following units controlling their output based on reference signals, such as
• Need for additional batteries in the DC-link of the converter-connected DER
units for power balance and voltage control during island operation with con-
ventional droop control
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• lack of adequate voltage control with Q/U-droops requiring a large amount of
reactive power to control voltage in LV networks
• more required capacity from grid-side converters
• lack of feasible protections system compatible with normal LV networks
• synchronized reconnection procedure not possible without communication.
All in all commercial DER units are not currently compliant to the technical re-
quirements present in decentralized microgrid operation. This is only natural be-
cause there also doesn't exist any national or international speciﬁcations that would
deﬁne these requirements. In the EU project More Microgrids Schwaegerl et al.
have visioned the MGCC as the responsible entity for the maximization in micro-
grid value, while the MCs perform local optimization in production and transient
conditions [17]. In the case of multiple owners of DG units with diﬀerent needs, an
energy cooperative or community with centralized control could provide an alterna-
tive to decentralized control with more eﬃcient system-wide resource optimization
and system management. A 2014 review of microgrid testbeds around the world by
Hossain et al. [19] shows a slight bias toward decentralized control methods, with
29 out of the 50 reviewed testbeds categorized as having either a decentralized or
agent-based control system. There are locational diﬀerences: North America seems
to be especially focused in decentralized systems (15 out of 20 testbeds), while in
Japan all 5 testbeds that were categorized had a centralized control system. Micro-
grids of the European Union and the rest of the world are almost equally distributed
between centralized and decentralized control. In future commercial microgrids the
adopted market mechanisms, regulation and grid codes will dictate how diﬀerent
parties will operate their available DER resources and what kind of services they
can oﬀer [5]. These decisions also have an eﬀect on what kind of control methods
will be the most viable and eﬃcient. In the scope of this thesis centralized solutions
are of speciﬁc interest since communication and therefore related standards are in-
herently important to the system, though as said decentralized solutions also have
some form of central coordination and communication capabilities as well.
2.1.2 Potential beneﬁts and example market models
Microgrid oﬀers potential beneﬁts to the microgrid clients, the distribution system
operator, possible third party operators and the public sector. The distribution sys-
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tem operator gets the most beneﬁts from the grid stability, reliability and service
related factors of microgrids. Local power balancing and demand side management
can be used to reduce local deviations or improve stability, or be oﬀered as a grid
supporting service. Reliability can be improved inside the microgrid as well as
potentially in the nearby utility network, if microgrid can provide support during
disturbances by for example load shedding, resulting in lower outage costs. Distri-
bution system upgrades due to increased peak power conditions can potentially be
postponed if these peaks are reduced through active microgrid management. The
development of DMS-like functionality in the microgrid management system can
also make it possible for the microgrid operator to take responsibility for end distri-
bution and quality of customer supply, with the responsibilities of the DSO ending
at the PCC.
For the microgrid clients potential beneﬁts include cost reductions, improved power
quality and reliability due to smart local resource management. Microgrids can
also promote the shift from consumers to prosumers, enabling clients to acquire
and integrate their own production more economically. Proper user interfaces can
provide more information about the eﬀects of customer decisions, further promoting
activity. Local trading or alternatively aggregation in the microgrid level can also
make it possible for individuals to participate in electricity markets in an inexpensive
way.
Microgids also oﬀer opportunities for 3rd party operators in whole new roles, like
providing the microgrid management and maintenance as a service to microgrid
clients, backup power and disturbance workforce to the DSO or acting as an ag-
gregator, collecting the small-scale DER units and demand response resources and
oﬀering them as an entity in the electricity markets or as technical services to the
DSO, such as frequency or voltage support. Microgrids can help the public sector
in achieving national or international energy goals through increased use of renew-
able energy sources, as well as reducing greenhouse gas emissions thorugh eﬀective
demand side management.
Some of the beneﬁts are shared between multiple stakeholders, and naturally the
investment costs as well as possible drawbacks in more complicated system usage
need to be taken into account when designing a fair market model between diﬀerent
actors in the microgrid environment. In [17] Schwaegerl et al. have identiﬁed three
typical setups for a microgrid market model: DSO Monopoly, Prosumer Consortium
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and Free Market. Finnish legislation eﬀectively prevents a DSO owned and operated
microgrid through the electricity market act [20], so only the prosumer consortium
and free market models are shortly presented here.
In a prosumer consortium microgrid single or multiple consumers will purchase and
operate DER units to minimize their electricity bill or maximize sales revenue from
export, as shown in Figure 2.3. A consortium of these prosumers may take the
responsibility of microgrid operation and purchase it as a service from a third party
provider. Most likely motivated by high retail electricity price or DER ﬁnancial
support level, this type of microgrid by nature tends to minimize the import from
the distribution grid and therefore reduce the revenue of the DSO [17]. Higher
power based pricing might be imposed to cover the network upkeeping costs. DSO
can inﬂuence the operation of the microgrid by imposing requirements and charges to
the DER unit owners, but the consortium makes the operational decisions according
to its own optimization goals. A local retail market must be allowed for the internal
trading of the consortium.
Figure 2.3 The cash ﬂows of the prosumer consortium microgrid market model [17].
The free market model shown in Figure 2.4 aims at ﬂexibly optimizing various
motives of diﬀerent stakeholders. The daily operation decisions will be dependent
on interest arbitration of all involved parties, and the microgrid central controller
(MGCC) plays an important role being simultaneously responsible for local balance,
import and export control, technical performance maintenance and emission level
monitoring. [17] Ideally this allows the beneﬁts of microgrid operation to be split
and directed to proper recipients.
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Figure 2.4 The cash ﬂows of the free market microgrid market model [17].
2.1.3 Properties and testbed experiences
Traditionally, the frequency response of larger power systems is based on rotating
masses of turbines and their governors, primarily found in large generation units,
that provide essential natural stability to the system. In microgrids the generation is
mainly converter-connected, with very few directly connected rotating masses and
thus very low inertia. With the addition of possibly slow control signal response
of some DG technologies, this creates power balance and voltage control challenges
and makes island operation technically demanding. Because of these reasons energy
storages are essential to stabilize the microgrid and permit DG units to run at a
stable output despite load or primary energy source ﬂuctuations. [5] The complete
frequency control strategy should exploit cooperatively the capabilities of DG units'
active power control, response of storage devices, and load shedding [15]. In addition
to the technical control challenges, economical goals of diﬀerent DER operators or
things like required heat generation in a CHP unit can cause additional constraints
for the usage of DER units.
In smaller microgrids a signiﬁcant degree of unbalance may exist due to the presence
of single phase loads and DER units. Also a considerable part of the supply within
a microgrid can come from non-controllable sources such as wind power units or PV
cells. [16] The control strategies for DER units must be designed to work in both
grid-connected and islanded operation, and oﬀer suﬃcient regulation of microgrid
voltage and frequency during islanded use.
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In [12] Soshinskaya et al. have collected experienced problems in real world mi-
crogrids, with technical issues divided in technological, dual-mode (island and grid-
connected) operation, power and frequency control, and protection and safety issues.
Especially fuel cells seem to cause a lot of technological problems, with Utsira Island,
Santa Rita Jail and Sendai microgrids all reporting fuel cell related issues. Kythnos
microgrid in Greece experienced communication problems in using Wi-ﬁ and PLC
channels due to humidity and rise of system frequency, respectively [21]. Concern-
ing dual-mode operation the Bronsbergen microgrid in Netherlands, equipped with
two parallel inverter systems, reported islanding detection to be "feasible but not
as straigthforward as it would be for a single inverter", underlining the need for
further research in the area. Power quality issues were also mentioned, with addi-
tional active compensation added in the inverters to reduce high 3rd, 5th and 7th
harmonic voltages during islanded mode. [13] The Hachinohe microgrid in Japan
reported a 2.6 Hz frequency drop and 6 % voltage drop with 50 kW AC startup, as
well as too high negative sequence current caused by phase unbalance. High speed
battery inverter control and a negative sequence compensator were used to solve the
problems. [22] While technical issues were among the most reported, they have a
multitude of potential solutions that already exist or are being researched. Soshin-
skaya et al. conclude that apart from the short term problem of the expensiveness of
DER units, the greatest barriers to microgrid implementation are related to regula-
tion and the market environment: issues regarding bi-directional power ﬂow between
the microgrid and utility network as well as the ability of local trading. [12]
2.2 Microgrid islanding and resynchronization principles
Previous sections have introduced typical microgrid structures and their main com-
ponents, and analysed properties and challenges associated with these new struc-
tures. In this section the controllable elements of microgrids are presented, and
then special attention is paid to the principles of islanding and resynchronizing pro-
cedures of microgrids, since these procedures are the ones with high relevance to
the microgrid protection system and the operation of its IEDs. The issues of energy
capacity and active power control during islanded operation are highly dependent on
the design and implementation of inverter control and therefore not in the focus of
this thesis. More on the development of appropriate control methods can be found
in e.g. [23], [24] and [25].
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2.2.1 Controllable elements in the microgrid
A microgrid acts inherently as a connector and service provider for a wide range of
diﬀerent energy resources, with varying possibilities for control. The distributed gen-
eration (DG) in a microgrid can be divided to intermittent and dispatchable units.
Intermittent units, using a renewable energy source (RES) such as wind or the sun as
their primary energy source, are limited by the physical nature of this source. Their
control is preferably based on maximum power point tracking (MPPT), a strategy
used to deliver the maximum power according to the optimal operation condition
of the unit's primary energy source at each moment [16]. Furthermore, limiting the
production of a RES unit is often undesirable because of the proportionally high
investment and very low operating costs of these units. Therefore the desired oper-
ation strategy for intermittent RES units can be described as "priority dispatch",
meaning their production will not be actively curtailed, limited or otherwise con-
trolled by an outside source unless it leads to violation of system constraints, such
as line overloads or overvoltage problems. However, the unit can have an indepen-
dent reactive power interface decoupled from its active power output, in which case
it can participate in the reactive power dispatch of the microgrid. [13] In islanded
use it may be desirable to limit changes in the active power. Additionally, if the
generation capacity is suﬃcient compared to the load and using the DG unit for
active power dispatch allows savings like in the form of smaller energy storages in
the system, controlling the output power may be economically beneﬁcial due to the
reduced investment costs.
Dispatchable DG units on the other hand allow their output power to be controlled
externally, through set points provided by a supervisory control system. Typical
example of a dispatchable unit is a synchronous generator driven by a reciprocating
internal combustion engine, equipped with a governor for speed control and fuel
in-ﬂow adjustment, as well as an automatic voltage regulator (AVR). The governor
controls the active power, while AVR controls the internal voltage of the synchronous
generator, and through that the reactive power output of the unit. [16] While CHP
units are often dispatchable in nature, their controllability varies according to the
chosen handling of local heat demand: the unit can be heat-driven, electricity-driven,
or operated in a hybrid mode [13].
Distributed Storage (DS) units in the microgrid can be operated as a balancing unit
in two principally diﬀerent ways. In a load-following scheme the storage acts as a
2.2. Microgrid islanding and resynchronization principles 21
balancing unit to load or RES production ﬂuctuations, charging itself during times
of low demand and high production and discharging during high demand to reduce
the maximum power required. In the price-following paradigm the storage is used
to maximize beneﬁts from price diﬀerences resulting from these ﬂuctuations over
time. The timespan of the balancing operation can vary from short-term (millisec-
onds to minutes) to long-term (hourly or even daily scale) range. [13] Additionally
energy storages may be used for power quality purposes, such as compensating for
harmonic or unbalanced current components, regulating voltage, reducing voltage
and frequency sags or compensating for transient disturbances in the grid [26].
Controllable loads participating in demand response can have a role similar to stor-
age units, temporarily reducing power usage in the grid instead of increasing power
output. While some loads may be deemed as critical and receive service priority
in the grid, others classiﬁed as nonsensitive can be for example shifted away from
the times of peak loads or scheduled according to the generation of intermittent
DG units [16]. This shifting can be made attractive to the customer through var-
ious remuneration scenarios. Time-of-use (ToU) tariﬀs oﬀer higher prices for peak
times of electricity usage like daytime hours during the workdays and lower prices
for oﬀ-peak times such as during the night or at weekends. As an example of the
relative costs, the Santa Rita Jail microgrid in the USA purchases its electricity
under PG&E's E-20 tariﬀ. The tariﬀ has 3 diﬀerent prices for oﬀ-peak, part-peak
and max peak times, with energy prices of 7,992, 9,807 and 14,040 c/kWh, respec-
tively. This corresponds to a 22,7% increase for part-peak and 75,7% increase for
max peak energy price compared to the oﬀ-peak price, creating a strong incentive
to push electricity purchases to oﬀ-peak times. [27] Other scenarios include dynamic
pricing in which the prices ﬂuctuate according to the actual wholesale electricity
prices like the hourly Nord Pool spot price in the Nordic countries [28], and critical
peak prices that has the same structure as ToU, but with very high prices when
wholesale electricity prices are high or the power system reliability is compromised.
The actual control of the loads can be either manual, e.g. controlled by the customer
with only price information delivered by the utility, or automated, in which case a
contract is made with the customer to allow automatic shifting by control or price
signals. [13] While balancing inside the microgrid might be the most convenient
use from the microgrid operator's point of view, several customer loads can also
be aggregated by a 3rd party operator and oﬀered as a bulk capacity to electricity
markets, such as in the pilot project between Fortum and the Finnish TSO Fingrid
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described in [29].
2.2.2 Islanding
Capability of islanding is one of the deﬁning properties of a microgrid. Transition to
island operation can happen either intentionally or unintentionally. Unintentional
islanding refers to spontaneous islanding due to a fault in the utility grid, while in-
tentional islanding means a planned and controlled operation mode transition. The
key diﬀerence is that in intentional islanding the active and reactive power ﬂows
between the microgrid and the utility grid are controlled close to zero before the
transition, so that a power balance inside the microgrid can be reached. The micro-
grid management system monitors the transition possibility continuosly: transition
is possible if the power unbalance inside the microgrid is smaller than the available
control capacity. This capacity consists of the control response of locally controlled
DER units, energy storages capable of rapid response, and the available controllable
loads in the microgrid provided their disconnection can be executed fast enough. [5]
Therefore high-speed communication between the management system and these
components or directly between components can make the transition easier.
In an unintentional islanding event, the microgrid can have three operation policies
depending on the requirements set by the DSO:
1. Disconnection required: the microgrid is seen as a single generation unit re-
garding the utility network, and therefore should be disconnected from the
network to prevent energized islands in the utility grid, according to the loss-
of-mains protection principles of generation units.
2. Disconnection possible: the microgrid operator can decide the action to take,
and may for example let the DG unit loss-of-mains protection operate before
disconnecting from the utility grid and starting coordinated energizing for
island operation.
3. Disconnection prohibited: The microgrid must support the utility network
during the fault like normal generation units according to predeﬁned fault
ride-through requirements. This would require a speciﬁcation of power system
requirements for microgrids.
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If separated, the microgrid is altered to a fault in the utility network for the time
before the interconnection switch or breaker at the PCC operates, disconnecting the
microgrid from rest of the network. This presents the most challenging islanding
scenario because the fault may easily compromise the stability of the microgrid after
islanding. Some of the most sensitive components present in microgrids regarding
stability issues are synchronous generators, induction motors and generators, and
the converters of converter-based DG units. As such their characteristics are of
signiﬁcant interest in the islanding of the microgrid, and will be examined next.
The fundamental equation describing the dynamics of a synchronous generator is
the swing equation
2H
ωs
d2δ(t)
dt2
= pm(t)− pe(t) = pa(t) (2.1)
where ωs is the electrical synchronous speed, H is the inertia constant, i.e. the
kinetic energy of the machine at synchronous speed divided by rated power, δ(t) is
the electrical angular displacement of the generator rotor, pm(t) is the mechanical
power input, pe(t) is the power of the generator's electrical load and pa(t) is the
accelerating power [30]. It can be seen from the equation 2.1 that a momentary
unbalance in the mechanical and electrical power (pm(t) 6= pe(t)) will result in a
non-zero accelerating power (pa(t) 6= 0), causing the generator's rotor to accelerate
(d2δ(t)/ dt2 > 0) or decelerate (d2δ(t)/ dt2 < 0). During a fault the electrical power
the generator can feed in to the network drops down along with the voltage of the
network while the mechanical power remains the same, causing the generator to
accelerate. The lower the voltage drops during the fault, the larger the accelerating
power will be, and on the other hand the longer the fault lasts the longer this
power will accelerate the generator. If the fault is not cleared fast enough, the
angular displacement grows too high and the generator loses synchronism with the
network, causing a disconnection. It can be seen from the swing equation that a
higher inertia constant H with the same accelerating power causes less acceleration
or deceleration of the generator rotor, increasing stability. Synchronous generators
connected to microgrids can have quite small inertia constants and therefore be
sensitive to system disturbances [5].
An induction motor can react to a voltage dip in two ways: 1) stall on the occurrence
of a voltage dip and not be able to reaccelerate its load when the supply voltage
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returns to normal, or 2) initially lose a certain amount of speed, accelerating back
to normal operation after the restoration of supply voltage. The factors determining
what happens in a speciﬁc scenario are largely the same as in the case of synchronous
generators, like the magnitude and length of the voltage dip and the motor inertia
constant. Additionally transient characteristics and the strength of the electrical
system in relation to the size of the motor aﬀect the currents fed to and drawn from
the grid during and after fault situations [31]. For induction generators, phase-to-
phase faults present the most diﬃcult conditions since it leads to highest overvoltages
induced by the stator ﬂuxes [32].
As can be seen, the duration of the fault is one of the critical components in de-
termining whether stability of these components can be maintained. Required fault
clearing time depends on the microgrid dynamics, type of DG units connected and
sensitivity of customer loads, and sets a minimum requirement for the operating
speed of the interconnection switch or breaker at the PCC of the microgrid. Instead
of a faster operating interconnection switch, another option would be to reduce the
voltage dip magnitude with for example an energy storage based power quality com-
pensator at the PCC, or even use a combination of both methods for very sensitive
customers [5].
Converters of converter-based DG units may potentially experience many kinds of
malfunctions during a fault. If their control is based on constant power control, a
sudden decrease in grid voltage will cause an increase in the current of a voltage
source converter (VSC) based DG unit. This may lead to the tripping of over-
current protection used to protect the insulated gate bipolar transistors (IGBTs) of
the VSC. Unbalanced voltage dips can produce both current harmonics and current
unbalance, which may also trigger an operation of current protection. An unbalanced
fault causes a negative-sequence component in the grid voltages, which gives rise
to second harmonic ripple in the system. This can be seen as ripple of the DC-
link voltage and output power and can lead to a trip if the maximum DC-link
voltage is exceeded. Additionally the second harmonic ripple propagates into the
DG unit converter controller and can cause poor power quality by producing a non-
sinusoidal current reference, even potentially leading to a system trip. Technical
solutions to deal with the problems mentioned above have been developed, such
as VSC controllers capable of dealing with grid voltage unbalance and improved
phase locked loop (PLL) algorithms to handle problems caused by second harmonic
ripple. [5]
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2.2.3 Resynchronization to the utility grid
The transition from island operation back to grid connected mode should also be
smooth and transient free so that loads do not experience disturbances during the
transition, and for this a robust grid synchronization scheme is needed [33]. Gen-
erally, before closing a circuit breaker with both sides of the connection energized,
synchrocheck relays are used to ensure suﬃcient synchronism between the two sides.
This means the voltage magnitude, voltage phase angle and frequency diﬀerences
between both sides must be under set values and both voltage magnitudes over set
minimums. [30] Ensuring small enough rate of change of frequencies and voltages is
also commonplace. Traditionally, voltage regulation of passively managed distribu-
tion networks is based on transformer on-load-tap-changers of HV/MV substations
and oﬀ-load tap changers of MV/LV substations. However, the resynchronization
of a microgrid requires ability to control the voltage in the islanded microgrid, and
diﬀers in many aspects from traditional synchronization of separate HV power sys-
tems with large directly connected synchronous generators. To examine diﬀerences
in the underlying control mechanisms, consider a power line in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5 Model of a short power line.
The power ﬂow at point A is
S = U1I
∗ = U1(
U1 − U2
Z
)∗ = U1(
U1 − U2 δ
Z −θ ) =
U21
Z
θ − U1U2
Z
θ + δ (2.2)
where U1 is the voltage at the beginning of the line, U2 the voltage at the end of the
line, δ the load angle and Z θ the line impedance. Rewriting 2.2 with Z θ = R+jX
we get
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S =
U1
R2 +X2
[R · (U1 − U2 cos δ) +X ·U2 sin δ]
+ j
U1
R2 +X2
[−R ·U2 sin δ +X · (U1 − U2 cos δ)]
(2.3)
where R is the line resistance and X is the line reactance. Since S = P + jQ,
seperating to real and imaginary parts we get the active and reactive power:
P =
U1
R2 +X2
[R · (U1 − U2 cos δ) +X ·U2 · sin δ] (2.4)
Q =
U1
R2 +X2
[−R ·U2 · sin δ +X · (U1 − U2 · cos δ)]. (2.5)
For typical HV overhead lines, X >> R. By neglecting resistance R and assuming
the load angle δ to be small, it can be approximated that sin δ ≈ δ and cos δ ≈ 1
and equations 2.4 and 2.5 can be reduced to
P ≈ U1U2
X
δ (2.6)
Q ≈ U
2
1
X
− U1U2
X
(2.7)
From equations 2.6 and 2.7 it can be seen that with HV lines the active power
P and the load angle δ and thus the frequency f are related, while the reactive
power Q and the voltage diﬀerence U1 − U2 are related. By adjusting P and Q
independently the frequency and voltage of the network can be controlled. This is
the basis of so called conventional droop control, where linear approximations for
the P/f and Q/U dependencies are used to control the active and reactive power
outputs of the generators in the grid:
f − f0 = −kp(P − P0) (2.8)
U1 − U0 = −kq(Q−Q0) (2.9)
where f0 and U0 are the rated frequency and grid voltage, P0 and Q0 are the given
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setpoints for active and reactive power and kp and kq are the droop coeﬃcients of
active and reactive power [34]. Typical LV overhead lines, on the other hand, are
dominantly resistive so that R >> X. In this case, neglecting the reactance X and
with the same assumption of the load angle being small, we get
P ≈ U
2
1
R
− U1U2
R
(2.10)
Q ≈ −U1U2
R
δ (2.11)
So in the case of a LV network, the dependencies are inverted: load angle δ and
frequency f are associated with reactive power Q, while active power P depends
mainly on the voltage diﬀerence U1 − U2. This would suggest the use of so called
opposite droops, i.e. P/U- and Q/f-droops in voltage and frequency control. While
P/U droop control would oﬀer direct voltage control, Engler states in [35] that
using opposite droops wouldn't make active power dispatch possible, and would
lead to compatibility problems with directly connected generators and higher voltage
levels. On the other hand, conventional droops are operable in the LV network DER
inverters through the indirect operation of droops. The inverter power is adjusted
by changing the inverter voltage with the reactive power Q, and because Q is a
function of the angle δ and δ is the integral over time of the generator's frequency
diﬀerence with the grid, a P/f- and Q/U-droop control can be established at the
cost of needing extra reactive power [35]. However, it is questionable if adequate
reactive power resources are available at LV level, and decentralized conventional
droop control without communication has its own technical challenges as well, as
discussed in 2.1.1.
An island operated microgrid may be in synchronism with the utility grid right af-
ter islanding, but as load and production changes in both the microgrid and utility
grid, the phase angle diﬀerence across the interconnection switch at the PCC will
change, and needs to be minimized before reconnection [5]. The standard IEEE 1547
"Standard for Interconnecting Distributed Resources with Electric Power Systems"
requires that the phase diﬀerence across the interconnection switch must be less than
20◦ before the switch can close. However, Eto et al. conclude in tests conducted
at the CERTS Microgrid Test Bed near Columbus, Ohio, that even stricter require-
ments are needed, suggesting closing "at a zero-phase diﬀerence". [36] Laaksonen
and Kauhaniemi state in [37] that with only converter connected DG units phase
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angle diﬀerences as large as slightly over 60◦ can be acceptable depending on the im-
plementation of the DG control system. This is due to the phase locked loop (PLL)
component of the DG unit converter drawing the converter to phase with the utility
grid frequency after reconnection [38]. However, in the case of directly connected
synchronous generators even a phase diﬀerence of 22◦ resulted in large oscillations
after reconnection, and a phase diﬀerence less than 10◦ was recommended. Closing
at a larger phase diﬀerence can also strain the turbines and gearboxes potentially
present in i.e. hydro and wind power plants.
As stated most of the DER units will be connected to the microgrid via power
electronic interfaces and the resynchronization can potentially be done through the
control of these units. The strategy used will depend on the chosen control concept
of the microgrid: centralized control with one master unit or decentralized control
of DER units through droop control. In a master unit conﬁguration, one inverter
such as a central energy storage is chosen as a master unit giving voltage reference
to other active and reactive power (PQ) controlled DER units. In this case a resyn-
chronization method such as proposed by Arulampalam et al. in [39] could be used
where the PLL output angle θ is used in the energy storage controller to regulate
the set reference system frequency and thus over time minimize the phase diﬀerence
to acceptable limits. With P/f-droop controlled DER units all DER unit converters
must be coordinated by a supervisory controller, using a method like shifting droop
control presented by Qiang et al. in [40]. In order to vary the island frequency and
thus the phase diﬀerence, preset droop curves are shifted to change the operating
frequency and voltage without changing the active or reactive power sharing between
sources. The change in actual frequency is determined by the shifting oﬀset value
provided by the central controller, and thus communication is required for the resyn-
chronization. The Q/f-dependency of LV networks discussed earlier can also provide
an alternative way to control the phase diﬀerence during resynchronization by coor-
dinated reactive power set point changes of the DER units [38]. In [38] Laaksonen
and Kauhaniemi also raise the possible issue of voltage unbalance in the microgrid
due to load asymmetry and single-phase DER units, leading to phase diﬀerence
deviation between each individual phase during resynchronization. In their simula-
tions controllable 1-phase loads were used to reduce the asymmetry, and potential
practical implementations of 1-phase DG units, energy storages or controllable loads
coordinated by the microgrid management system were suggested.
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3. MICROGRID PROTECTION
In general, power system protection is responsible for detecting and isolating oc-
curring faults or abnormal conditions in the network, protecting humans, animals
and electrical equipment from potential damage. The power system is divided into
protection zones, containing devices, typically circuit breakers, capable of isolating
that particular part from the rest of the grid. These devices are controlled by the
protection system consisting of protection relays, instrument transformers, and all
the associated wiring, communication and automation. Main requirements for the
protection system can be categorized as selectivity, speed and reliability.
Selectivity means that 1) only the faulty part of the network shall be isolated, thus
minimizing the harm caused by the fault, and 2) every part of the network is pro-
tected by at least one protection device. [30] Selectivity can be based on time delays
coordinated between protection relays, or be implemented by deﬁning appropriate
operation curves for protection devices and their functions. Operation curves deﬁne
the time delay between relay pick-up and sending of the trip command as a func-
tion of the measured quantity, enabling both selectivity in faults far away and fast
fault clearance in nearby faults. For example an inverse-time over-current relay trips
faster with higher fault currents. Figure 3.1 presents diﬀerent operation curves for
such a relay as deﬁned in the standard IEC 60255, with IS being the chosen pickup
current. Operation speed of the protection system is very important in minimizing
the negative eﬀects caused by a fault.
Lastly, reliability of the protection system consists of two requirements. Security of
protection ensures a relay does not send a tripping signal if there is no fault in its
protection zone, i.e. there is no false operation. Dependability of protection means
that the protection relay shall detect all the faults in its protection zone, i.e. the
protection system must operate in all abnormal conditions. [30] A common practice
is to also ensure redundancy of protection functions, so that a fault is isolated even
if the associated main protection device fails to operate, conforming to the N-1
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Figure 3.1 IEC overcurrent relay operation curves according to IEC 60255 [41].
criterion [30, 41, 42].
An example of a microgrid protection system based on [25] is shown in Figure
3.2. The microgrid central controller (MGCC) as a central entity is responsible
for coordinating protection settings and communication based protection schemes
between IEDs. It can also provide set points for voltage, frequency and active
and reactive power outputs of DER units in the microgrid. In the case of a LV
microgrid, it is questionable whether sectionalizing individual LV feeders to more
than one protection zone, such as in the ﬁgure with CB6 and CB7, is justiﬁable with
the amount of faults in the LV network and associated outage costs [37]. Otherwise
the example system gives an overview of typically available control equipment and
entities regarding microgrid protection.
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Figure 3.2 An example of a microgrid protection system.
The protection of microgrids has to solve two major issues in its design. Firstly, the
conditions and operation times for islanding during possible faults in grid-connected
mode must be examined. From operation point of view, maintaining the connec-
tion between the microgrid and the utility is highly desirable, but when islanding
is mandatory, the operation speed must be suﬃcient to maintain stability of the
microgrid after islanding as discussed in Section 2.2.2. Secondly, the stand-alone
microgrid itself must be divided to protection zones with coordinated fault protec-
tion that ensures suﬃcient selectivity and prevents unwanted operations, such as
unnecessary disconnections of DER units. [25]
The deﬁnition of "suﬃcient selectivity" varies largely according to the size and volt-
age level of a microgrid as well as chosen protection principles. It can be argued that
a fault inside a microgrid after separation from the utility grid is an N-2 contingency,
and the island can therefore be shut down without selectivity. If the microgrid con-
tains enough critical loads or covers a large area, the added cost of coordinating
protection zones inside the microgrid can be justiﬁable. In this chapter protection
schemes are reviewed regarding their technical capabilities and ability to support
selective operation also in internal faults of the microgrid after islanding. First,
the main protection issues regarding microgrids are presented. Next, possible non-
adaptive protection schemes are examined, and then special attention is paid to the
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principles of adaptive protection, which has been widely presented as an important
or even a necessarily required part of microgrid and active distribution grid protec-
tion [4247]. Lastly one complete protection solution for a LV microgrid is presented
as an example of possible merging of diﬀerent protection methods.
3.1 Protection issues of microgrids
Due to the diﬀerences discussed in chapter 2 between microgrids and conventional
utility distribution networks in topologies and power system components as well as
operation principles, the protection of microgrids has several issues that need to be
addressed by its protection system. Some of the presented aspects such as eﬀects of
DER penetration are also present in modern distribution networks, and some such
as islanding issues are unique to microgrids.
3.1.1 Eﬀects of DER units on conventional protection
Conventional protection in distribution networks is based on over-current (OC) re-
lays and, in LV networks, fuse protection [13]. The selectivity of the protection
system is achieved by time or current coordination principles. These methods are
designed for radial networks with unidirectional power ﬂow. However, the presence
of distributed generation in a network alters the magnitudes and possibly the di-
rections of fault currents in the network and therefore the traditional coordination
is either adversely aﬀected or even completely lost. The potential problems for
traditional feeder protection that can be caused by distributed generation include
• False tripping: the DG unit feeds current to a fault on a nearby feeder through
a station busbar, causing false tripping of the feeder it is connected to if non-
directional OC protection is used.
• Blinding of protection: the DG unit feeds current to the fault at the feeder and
lowers the amount of fault current fed through the feeder protection device,
preventing the operation of feeder protection. To a deﬁnite-time OC relay
this corresponds to shortening the protection zone of the device, and to an
inverse-time OC relay a change in the operation curve of the relay.
• Prevention of automatic reclosing: The DG unit maintains the voltage during
automatic reclosing function of feeder protection, maintaining the arc at fault
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location. Related to this, the reclosing function may cause the DG unit to
be connected to the utility network out of synchronism if the DG unit is not
disconnected during the dead time of the autoreclosing function.
The contribution of DG units to faults depend largely on the type of the unit.
Synchronous generators feed larger and stable fault currents, and while this may
contribute to malfunctions of protection such as mentioned above, it is clearly de-
tectable. But as discussed in Section 2.1.1, DER units with power electronic in-
terfaces are becoming more and more prevalent at the distribution level, and these
units behave very diﬀerently from traditional generation. Diﬀerent inverter designs
also have diﬀerent constants and there is no uniform characteristic that could rep-
resent inverters as a class of equipment [25]. One of the biggest diﬀerences is that
unless speciﬁcally designed to provide a high fault current, inverter-based units have
very low fault feed-in capacity that can be in the order of 2-3 times the load cur-
rent or possibly even less [46]. In the case of microgrids with signiﬁcant amount of
power electronic interfaced DER units this may present a complete change of system
behaviour between grid-connected and islanded mode considering fault situations.
In grid-connected mode, large fault currents can be available from utility network,
but during island operation OC protection with the same settings may operate too
slowly, lose selectivity or even not operate at all [25]. If relay operation is to be
ensured by setting changes, the reduced diﬀerence between the highest load current
and lowest fault current can lead to nuisance tripping of protection.
3.1.2 Changing grid conﬁgurations, islanding and speed re-
quirements
In addition to the new challenges the characteristics of DER units bring, an extra
issue is that the presence of these units may vary according to several diﬀerent
possible optimization goals of the unit operator or due to the availability of the
primary energy source. This forces the protection system to take into account all
possible diﬀerent conﬁgurations the microgrid can have, and for example depending
on the topology as well as type and location of the DER units, may mean the
direction of fault currents can change between diﬀerent conﬁgurations.
The speed requirements for microgrid protection are deﬁned by two main criteria:
stability and customer sensitivity [48]. Stability has been formally deﬁned by a joint
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task force of IEEE and CIGRE in 2004 as "the ability of an electric power system,
for a given initial operating condition, to regain a state of operating equilibrium after
being subjected to a physical disturbance, with most system variables bounded so
that practically the entire system remains intact." [49] It is worth noting that the
deﬁnition examines the whole system: if one generation unit disconnects after losing
stability due to a disturbance, the rest of the system can still maintain stability. In
the case of a microgrid the most challenging situations are the transient conditions
following islanding from the utility grid and a fault occurring in the microgrid during
island operation. Especially directly connected rotating machines are very sensitive
to losing stability due to voltage dips caused by faults, and can further jeopardize
the stability of the whole microgrid. The stability of diﬀerent microgrid components
was discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.2.
Due to utility side faults often presenting very challenging conditions, it is essential to
ensure that especially the protection at the PCC will operate fast enough to minimize
the fault and voltage-dip duration. Structural choices aﬀecting the operation time
include the chosen switch technology, communication technology and the size of
distributed or central energy storages in the microgrid. [48] In addition to traditional
circuit breakers (CBs) operating in the time scale of 20 to 100 ms, static switches
(SSs) based on silicon controlled rectiﬁers (SCRs) or even insulated gate bipolar
transistors (IGBTs) could be used to achieve operation times in the range of 5-20
ms or 100 µs, respectively [50]. If a protection scheme is based on communication
between devices, the chosen communication technology naturally adds its own total
delay to the operation time of the protection devices. The size of energy storages in
the microgrid aﬀect the needed operation speed indirectly by two ways: mainly, with
larger storage it is possible to withstand larger oscillations without losing system
stability during islanding, and secondly it may also increase the fault-current feeding
capability of the microgrid in islanded mode, thus possibly making protection like
customer fuses operate faster [48].
While the speed of protection is especially important in faults where microgrid has to
be separated from utility network, it is also important to pay attention to preventing
spurious separations, i.e. false trips at the PCC. Voltage and frequency protection
are necessary functions at the PCC, but using only local information for them may
not always be enough to determine whether the fault is on the utility feeder or within
the microgrid itself [25], potentially leading to incorrect operation. Another issue is
the settings of voltage unbalance protection, since a certain degree of unbalance is
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already present in normal operations and for more severe conditions it may again be
diﬃcult to determine if the cause is external or internal in the microgrid. Exporting
microgrids have additional problems since over- and undervoltage relaying may not
be enough to ensure the detection of utility faults when the microgrid itself can have
enough generation capacity to maintain voltage during faults [25]. Furthermore, it
is possible to have non-fault cases resulting in low voltages at the PCC such as
voltage unbalances and non-fault open phases which are diﬃcult to detect. In [46]
Memon and Kauhaniemi state that currently the only reliable method in achieving
both fast tripping of the PCC breaker as well as avoiding spurious separations is to
have a transfer trip signal from the utility substation breaker upstream of the PCC,
requiring high speed communication. The consequences of spurious separations
depend on the operational capabilites of the microgrid, and a cost-beneﬁt analysis
is needed for assessing the justiﬁcation of expenses on more sophisticated protection
versus the increased reliability it brings.
In islanded mode, an essential issue that must be solved is the potential loss of neu-
tral connection of the utility transformer if the PCC breaker is located downstream
from the transformer. Unless another delta-wye transformer with the microgrid
side directly earthed is present in the island, high earth fault currents cannot be
ensured. [37] Similarly in centrally compensated MV networks earth fault current
compensation can be lost, aﬀecting the fault currents and protection requirements
during earth faults.
3.1.3 FRT requirements and anti-islanding protection of DER
units
The protection requirements of DER units in the microgrid are dictated by coun-
try grid codes but also the operation of other protection devices in the microgrid.
The operation curves of diﬀerent devices deﬁne the fault ride-through (FRT) re-
quirements for DER units, i.e. the operation limits in which the unit should still
operate normally without disconnection. For example DER units need to have the
capability to cope with the voltage and frequency transients caused by islanding,
since disconnection during islanding would further jeopardize the stability of the
microgrid. Similarly in a microgrid consisting of several feeders the unit shouldn't
disconnect on a fault on a nearby feeder before the feeder protection of the faulted
feeder operates. Another issue is the anti-islanding or Loss-of-Mains (LoM) protec-
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tion of DER units. Traditionally these smaller units rely on the main power system
for stability, neutral earthing and reliable fault currents, so protection is ﬁtted to
detect situations where the connection to main power system is lost. However, in
the case of a microgrid, islanding can happen intentionally at the PCC. This poses a
possible conﬂict between utility requirements or grid codes and the desired microgrid
operational capabilities. The anti-islanding protection may therefore be needed to
be disabled along with the islanding of the microgrid if the amount of microsource
generation within the microgrid is high [25]. Due to the typically high speed op-
eration of anti-islanding protection, it might be needed to be deactivated instantly
after islanding to prevent the fast tripping.
Another possible issue regarding earthing is if the DG units are connected to the
microgrid via a delta-wye transformer where the generator side neutral point is
directly earthed. This connection causes inability to detect an earth fault from the
generator side, since the zero-sequence network is disconnected at the transformer
and no earth fault current is fed from the generator. Possible solutions include either
installing a residual voltage relay at the grid side of the DG unit or disconnection
of the unit after feeder protection has already operated. Safety aspects require a
fast disconnection of the unit, but on the other hand the installed relay can detect
earth faults independent of their location in the network, creating a possibility of
unnecessary separations. [51]
3.2 Available non-adaptive protection schemes
A variety of protection schemes has been proposed to be used in microgrids. Some
schemes are designed for grid-connected operation, corresponding to protection of
modern distribution networks with a high penetration of DER, some are designed
speciﬁcally to address the issues of islanded mode, and some are applicable to both
operation modes. In this section an overview of proposed schemes using principles
applicable without adaptivity is presented. In this context non-adaptive means the
protection response of the protection system is not modiﬁed according to power sys-
tem conditions. Schemes based on adaptivity are discussed in their own Section 3.3.
It should be noted that some form of adaptivity can and is even often proposed to
be added to presented methods in some form, and can possibly be used to over-
come some of the disadvantages of said methods. In any case, it is very probable
that a complete solution of microgrid protection incorporates and combines several
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diﬀerent protection schemes. A summary of proposed microgrid protection schemes
is presented in Table 3.1. High impedance faults (HIF) mentioned in the table do
not have a strict impedance limit or deﬁnition, but they can be described as faults
in which the fault impedance is high enough that detection by conventional fault
current magnitude measurements is generally not possible [52]. Of the presented
schemes voltage and THD based protection as well as distance and diﬀerential pro-
tection are examined in more detail in this section. While cost-beneﬁt analysis is not
in the scope of this thesis, it should be noted that sophisticated protection schemes
often come with a very high implementation cost compared to current systems, es-
pecially if LV networks are considered. Currently it requires a high criticality of
loads and a very speciﬁc environment, such as the protection of a data center, to be
able to justify such a system.
3.2.1 Voltage based protection
A voltage based protection scheme for microgrids with converter based DGs was pre-
sented in 2006 by Al-Nasseri and Redfern in [54]. The scheme is based on measuring
the DG output voltages and converting them to DC quantities in the synchronous ro-
tating d-q frame of reference based on the dq0 or Park transformation [62]. Network
faults can then be detected as a disturbance in the d-q quantities. A disturbance
signal VDIST is calculated and then ﬁltered by comparing calculated and reference
three-phase balanced d-q values. Under normal conditions calculated values match
the reference values, and the value of VDIST is zero. In case of a fault, the disturbance
voltage exhibits diﬀerent behaviours according to the type of the fault:
• in a three-phase fault, VDIST is pure DC voltage.
• in a two-phase fault, VDIST consists of a DC signal with ac ripple.
• in a single-phase fault, VDIST is an oscillating signal between zero and a max-
imum value.
Therefore it is possible to recognize the type of fault. The scheme uses a commu-
nication link between relays for comparing the mean average values of VDIST and
uses this information to identify in-zone and out of zone faults and tripping the
appropriate relay. The scheme has been veriﬁed by simulations of diﬀerent faults
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Table 3.1 Non-adaptive microgrid protection schemes
Principle of fault detection Advantages/ disadvantages [46, 53]
Voltage-
based protec-
tion [54]
Disturbance in the d-q transfor-
mation of DER terminal voltages
+ applicable with low fault currents, ver-
iﬁed with simulations for various fault
types and locations
− HIF and single-pole tripping not taken
to account
THD-based
protec-
tion [55]
Raised THD level of DER termi-
nal voltages
+ applicable with low fault currents
− possible trip failures with dynamic
loads
− determining THD thresholds for diﬀer-
ent fault types may prove diﬃcult
Distance pro-
tection [56]
Impedance calculation from fault
current and voltage at relay loca-
tion
+ applicable to all network topologies
− DG units in protection zone cause er-
rors without adaptivity
Diﬀerential
current pro-
tection [57]
Comparison of current samples
on opposite ends of protected
part of the system
+ detects HIF, comprehensive simula-
tions
− uneconomical, assumes very high per-
formance of equipment, transient condi-
tions may pose problems
Symmetrical
components
and resid-
ual current
based protec-
tion [58]
Residual and zero sequence cur-
rent measurements
+ no communication needed
− need for overload and voltage backup
protection
− considers only two-phase short-circuit
and single-phase earth faults
Inverse-time
admittance-
based protec-
tion [59]
Comparison of line admittance
measurement to normalized ad-
mittance value
+ no communication needed, applicable
with low fault currents
− slow tripping for HIF and higher DG in-
feed, measurement errors from harmonics,
transients and decaying DC components
Current trav-
eling waves
based protec-
tion [60]
Busbar residual voltage for
fault detection and comparison
of wavelet transform of zero-
sequence current traveling waves
for fault location
+ unaﬀected by power ﬂow, fault current,
unbalance, connection of DG units and
microgrid operational mode
− no simulation results
Pattern
recognition
based protec-
tion [61]
Diﬀerential energies from time-
frequency transform of opposite
bus currents used to register
fault patterns and threshold val-
ues for tripping
+ better performance compared to dif-
ferential current protection, immune to
noise, less sensitive to synchronisation er-
ror
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at diﬀerent locations of a test microgrid system and is proposed to provide compli-
mentary protection to conventional OC relaying in low fault current situations [54].
Voltage sags are taken into account by tolerating voltage magnitudes of 50 % for
200 ms, 70 % for 0,5 s and 80 % for up to 1 s. Despite this Mirsaeidi et al. argue
in [53] that voltage drops within the microgrid may still lead to misoperations. In
the end, FRT requirements deﬁned for the system set the limits needed for voltage
sag tolerance and deﬁne correct operation. Other shortcomings mentioned include
inability to detect high impedance faults (HIF) and a strong dependency on the
microgrid conﬁguration combined with test results only for a speciﬁc microgrid. In
their review of AC microgrid protection solutions, Memon and Kauhaniemi note
that high impedance faults (HIF) as well as single-pole tripping haven't been taken
to account [46].
3.2.2 THD based protection
Same authors have also proposed a harmonics content based protection scheme
in [55]. The protection is based on computing the discrete Fourier transform (DFT)
and thus monitoring the total harmonic distortion (THD) of the inverter terminal
phase voltages at each DG unit, causing a disconnection if the THD exceeds the
set pick-up value. In normal operation, the utility distribution network acts as
a low impedance, stiﬀ voltage source maintaining a low THD of voltage at the
inverter terminal. When the microgrid transitions to islanded mode, the impedance
seen at the terminal increases as only local network and loads remains connected
and as a result, current harmonics at inverter output will cause increased level of
voltage harmonics in the terminal voltage [55]. The proposed scheme consists of two
stages. Firstly, the amplitude of the fundamental frequency of each phase is used to
identify the fault type. According to simulation results presented the amplitude of
the fundamental frequency will drop signiﬁcantly for a faulted phase compared to
healthy phases, and thus this comparison allows to identify between single phase,
phase to phase and three phase faults. In the second stage the faulted phase is
identiﬁed by comparing THD values of all phases, since the harmonic content of the
faulted phase will be much greater than that of a healthy phase. Furthermore, a
communication link is necessary to share the THD values between the relays at DGs
to coordinate tripping: the relay with higher total harmonic content of all phases is
recognized to be in or nearer to the fault zone and should be tripped. Simulation
results presented are for two identical converter based DGs, with the authors noting
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that "in the case when the two DGs are diﬀerent theoretically the idea should be still
valid" unless one of the DGs has zero harmonics distortion, in which case another
type of protection would have to be used. It is also recognized that several dynamic
loads present in the microgrid may cause trip failures, and the scheme is proposed as
complementary or backup for the main protection devices [55]. In [46], Memon and
Kauhaniemi also mention diﬃculty of assessing THD threshold values for diﬀerent
fault types as well as sensitivity problems with varying fault impedances as possible
limitations for the technique.
3.2.3 Diﬀerential protection
Sortomme et al. have described a protection scheme based on diﬀerential protection
in [57]. The scheme uses digital relays including standard OC and over-/undervoltage
protection. Primary protection is based on diﬀerential current protection with a
minimum of 16 current samples per cycle transmitted via a communication link and
then compared between relays on the opposite ends of distribution feeder. Instan-
taneous operation is suggested when absolute values of two samples are above the
trip treshold, and a backup trip signal to be sent to adjacent relays of the same bus
in the case of a switching device failure if the diﬀerential current remains for longer
than an allowed time delay in the range of 0.3-0.6 s. Further backup protection for
communication link or relay failures is suggested by switching to comparative volt-
age protection on remaining relays and tripping under 0.7 pu voltages in 0.6-0.9 s
for the relay with the lowest voltage, and in 1 s for each DG source in the system. A
comprehensive simulation of a test system has been conducted for all fault locations
and high impedance single-phase earth-faults in addition to regular fault types. It
is noted the scheme wouldn't be economically justiﬁable because of the amount of
relays and switching devices. In literature reviews, both Memon and Kauhaniemi
in [46] as well as Gopalan et al. in [63] note that in addition to being expensive
the scheme assumes beyond state-of-the-art technical features of equipment such as
highly sensitive and error-free current transformers (CTs). Furthermore Mirsaeidi
et al. note in [53] that unbalanced systems and transients during connection and
disconnection of DG units may pose problems to diﬀerential protection schemes.
In [64] Sortomme et al. have presented a relay and sensor placement optimization
algorithm to minimize the equipment costs and system outages, reported to result
in savings of 50 % in relay and sensor costs compared to the scheme in [57] for the
example microgrid.
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3.2.4 Distance protection
Distance protection is based on measuring the impedance between a relay and the
fault location by comparing fault current seen by the relay against the voltage at
relay location. Comparing this impedance Zf = U/If to the known impedance
of the protected line the fault can be located and tripping characteristics speciﬁed
for desired reach along the line, i.e. values of Zf . It is usual to deﬁne several time-
coordinated protection zones for diﬀerent reaches as percentage of line impedance to
achieve backup protection and selectivity between distance relays, as demonstrated
in Figure 3.3. [41]
Figure 3.3 Distance protection zones [65].
The natural beneﬁts of distance protection include applicability in ring and meshed
conﬁgurations as well as independence from the current source impedance. The use
of distance protection in MV microgrids and networks with DG penetration has been
investigated by Voima et al. in [56] and [66]. In [56] the applicability of distance
protection with no DG units between the relay and fault location was investigated
by simulations. Under this restriction the accuracy was deemed suﬃcient for the
test network topology, but authors noted further studies are required for diﬀerent
topologies and fault types. In [66], it is noted that connection of DG units in
the protection zone causes an impedance measurement error proportional to the
ratio of current at relay location and the in-feed current of the DG unit. The
proposed solution to this problem includes telecommunications and adaptivity, and
is discussed in the next section.
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3.3 Adaptive protection
As discussed in 3.1.2, the protection system in microgrids has to take into account
the possible conﬁguration changes in the microgrid. These include the connection
and disconnection of DER units each with their own characteristics, reconﬁguration
of the network after fault clearance, and transitions between islanded and grid-
connected modes. To solve this problem, the methodology of adaptive protection
has been adopted to microgrids. Adaptive protection can be deﬁned as "an online
activity that modiﬁes the preferred protective response to a change in system condi-
tions or requirements ... in a timely manner by means of externally generated signals
or control action" [67]. In the case of a microgrid, an adaptive protection system
identiﬁes changes in microgrid conﬁguration or DER connections and accordingly
changes settings of protective relays as needed to ensure the protection requirements
are fulﬁlled. This can mean adjusting the settings of the applied protection functions
but may also include enabling or disabling diﬀerent protection functions. Modern
numerical relays can have several pre-conﬁgured settings groups, each corresponding
to a diﬀerent microgrid conﬁguration, that can be enabled remotely. Instead of pre-
calculated settings groups, it might be even possible to recalculate the protection
settings in real-time, as demonstrated in [42].
This section ﬁrst discusses the communication needs of an adaptive protection sys-
tem, and then examines adaptive methods suggested to be incorporated to OC and
distance protection as examples of possible implementations. Voima, Laaksonen
and Kauhaniemi have compared the performance of directional overcurrent and dis-
tance protection in [47], noting distance protection performs better during island
operation but is limited in its applicable use cases. While directional OC protec-
tion suﬀers from the changes in short circuit levels in islanded operation, distance
protection can be adversely aﬀected by an intermediate in-feed of DER unit in the
distance protection zone, as mentioned in 3.2.4. Both of these schemes may be po-
tentially enhanced with adaptivity. As stated earlier, adaptivity can very well be
incorporated to other protection schemes as well with methodology similar to what
is presented.
3.3.1 Communication requirements
A few protection schemes have been proposed where some form of adaptivity is
achieved without the use of a communication network between protective devices.
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In [68] Tumilty et al. propose a voltage restrained overcurrent protection scheme
for inverter dominated distribution systems: a large drop in voltage causes OC
protection to select a lower current threshold, moving the operation curve and re-
ducing tripping times. The intended use is to discriminate between short-circuit
and overload conditions and adjust operation speed accordingly. In [69] Dang et al.
have proposed an adaptive protection scheme in a microgrid containing an energy
storage connected with an isolation transformer. The scheme uses the earthings of
said transformer and the utility MV/LV transformer to discriminate between grid-
connected and islanded modes. The angle of measured zero sequence impedance
Z θ at a protection device is compared to the zero sequence impedance angles θT1
and θT2 corresponding to conﬁgurations with the diﬀerent transformers. Then a
protection method is chosen based on this information, using overcurrent protection
for grid-connected operation and voltage protection scheme as described in 3.2.1 for
islanded mode. However, applicability of these schemes is rather marginal and the
deﬁnite majority of adaptive protection schemes raise the ability for communication
as a key property of the system.
In general communication with a central system such as the MGCC or between
individual protection devices is seen necessary to facilitate the identiﬁcation of grid
conﬁguration changes and the changing of setting groups, and using standard-based
communication ensures reliable interoperability of devices. If basic backup protec-
tion exists during the reconﬁguration phase (according to the N-1 principle), com-
munication delays for setting changes are not critical and delay times in the order
of 1-10 s can be tolerable [70]. It should be noted that this is far from the require-
ments of actual protection functions such as interlocking, which are time-critical.
For example the IEC 61850 series discussed in Chapter 4 deﬁnes three performance
classes for protection function messages with required transfer times in the range of
5-20 ms [71]. Naturally a communication system capable of this level of performance
will be signiﬁcantly more costly compared to one operating in the 1-10 s time range.
One case where fast communication might still be necessary is the anti-islanding
protection of DER units discussed in Section 3.1.3, in which either the islanding
must be locally detected reliably and fastly or a communication signal must be used
to disable the fast anti-islanding protection from tripping after intentional island-
ing. These fast communication based protection functions may also be necessary if
selectivity is to be ensured in all microgrid faults [47, 48].
With the introduction of communication to protection systems, even if only used for
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status information or measurements, a new potential point of failure is also intro-
duced to the system. Validity of data cannot be guaranteed, and therefore missing
or erroneous information should not create potential hazards in the system. More
importantly, supervision of the communication network needs to be ensured at a
suﬃcient level, and valid backup protection schemes operable without communica-
tion must be prepared in the event of a network failure. An example of possible
supervision might be a recurring transmission of the monitored information at reg-
ular intervals: if the information is not received at these pre-deﬁned intervals, a
communication failure can be identiﬁed within a reasonable time frame.
3.3.2 Adaptive over-current protection
The methods of adaptive protection have been proposed in for example [70], [72], [73]
and [74] as a way to make overcurrent protection of microgrids feasible even with
the challenges discussed in Section 3.1. Perhaps the most complete approach is
presented by Oudalov and Fidigatti in [70] with an adaptive protection method for
microgrids using directional over-current relays. The process consists of oine anal-
ysis and online operation. In the oine analysis an event table is generated for all
meaningful microgrid conﬁgurations and feed-in states of DER units, representing
positions of circuit breakers in the microgrid. Then fault analysis is carried out
for diﬀerent types of faults at diﬀerent locations in the network, modifying repeti-
tively a single status of a CB or DER unit after each iteration. The results, namely
magnitudes and directions of fault currents seen by each relay, are then used to
calculate suitable settings for each relay and each particular system state to guar-
antee selective operation. These settings may also include activation of protection
functions like interlocking. During online operation a central controller is proposed
to monitor the microgrid state by polling individual relays 1) periodically and 2)
after triggered by an event like the tripping of a CB or a protection alarm. This
state information is then compared to the event table, and the pre-calculated relay
settings corresponding to the current system state are retrieved and uploaded to the
relays. The growing complexity of the setting determination and choosing logic in
wider and more complicated network conﬁgurations such as in MV microgrids may
prevent the scheme's realistic applicability in all situations.
A very similar scheme is proposed by Ustun et al. in [74], though the proposed
adaptivity only considers the PCC connection and DER units, monitoring their
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on/oﬀ-statuses, rated currents and fault current contributions. Some possible sim-
pliﬁcations have also been proposed to promote a plug-and-play capability of DER
units, such as assuming the fault contribution of a DER unit to be equal in all parts
of the microgrid and approximating DG fault contributions as 1,2 times their rated
current. All in all, authors of adaptive OC protection schemes conclude the need
for more comprehensive testing in a variety of diﬀerent test networks in the future.
3.3.3 Adaptive distance protection
In [66] Voima and Kauhaniemi expand their earlier work [56] presented in Sec-
tion 3.2.4 on distance protection in MV distribution networks to cover a wider
variety of cases. Namely, the possibility of an intermediate in-feed of DER units
in the protection zone of the distance relay is investigated. The error in measured
impedance caused by the in-feed is illustrated in Figure 3.4. The article considers
converter connected DG units, and views them as constant current sources during
the fault. As can be seen, multiple DG units in the protection zone of a distance re-
lay each add a discontinuation point in the measured impedance. The magnitude of
impedance error caused by the in-feed of DG is inversely proportional to the source
fault current Is [66], and therefore the eﬀect is more severe in islanded mode where
large fault currents from the utility network are not present. Since the measured
impedance is larger with the intermediate in-feeds, the relay sees the fault farther
away and thus the fault may fall into a further time grading zone than it actually
is, meaning protection will operate slower and this may lead to selectivity problems.
The proposed solution is based on limited telecommunication capability of DG units
in the system, with communication not fast enough for actual protection use but
enough for the protection system to be notiﬁed of all unit connection status changes.
Converter based DG units are considered as constant current sources and their fault
current contribution and therefore the eﬀect to distance relay reach can be taken
into account by adjusting the impedance limits according to the connection of units,
like has been presented in [75]. The requirement for applicability of the scheme is
that short-circuit contributions of the DG units must be known. Microgrids with
both converter based and directly connected synchronous DGs are not discussed
in the proposition, and larger scale simulation studies are mentioned as necessary
future work.
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Figure 3.4 The eﬀect of intermediate in-feeds on measured impedance of a distance
relay [66].
3.4 An example LV microgrid protection solution
Many diﬀerent protection schemes can be used and combined when designing a
complete solution for protection of a speciﬁc microgrid. Here a protection concept
for a LV microgrid presented by Laaksonen and Kauhaniemi in [37] and Laaksonen
in [48] is detailed as an example of such a solution. The concept partly relies
on high speed communication used for actual protection functions, and in general
assumes a high level of controllable devices and measurements for a LV network.
Therefore at least currently the implementation of such a scheme would probably not
be economically feasible, but the concept still provides an example of the principles
in merging diﬀerent types of protection, adaptivity and communication possibilities
of the future. Protection zones and location of protection devices, along with possible
fault locations are shown in Figure 3.5. As can be seen, four types of protection
devices (PDs) with diﬀerent requirements have been identiﬁed.
PD1 is responsible for the microgrid protection in the point of common coupling
(PCC), equipped with a circuit breaker (CB) or a fast static switch (SS). It requires
both voltage and frequency measurements. Undervoltage operation must be very
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Figure 3.5 Protection zones and devices with possible fault locations in a LV micro-
grid. [48]
fast to clear faults at location F1 quickly, while frequency protection can be oper-
ated with a longer time-delay. Loss-of-mains (LoM) protection is proposed to be
enhanced with high-speed communication via a transfer trip (disconnection signal
sent after operation) from the upstream MV feeder protection, as a backup to the
voltage protection. Intentional islanding operation is also handled by PD1 with a
disconnection signal from the DSO. Lastly, in the case of a fault in location F2 or
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F3, PD2 sends an interlocking signal to PD1 as soon as the pick-up limit of PD2 is
reached to prevent unselective tripping. When transitioning back to grid-connected
mode after islanding, a synchronism check function is required to ensure voltage
magnitude, phase angle and frequency are within acceptable ranges of each other
on both sides of the PD before closing the interconnection switch.
PD2 takes care of the individual LV feeder protection. Equipped with a directional
over-current function (DOC), it operates only on F2 faults in its own feeder. The
DOC is conﬁgured to have time-delay based selectivity with PD1 and PD3. As
mentioned, selectivity with PD1 is further ensured with an interlocking signal sent
after the current pick-up limit is reached. In island operation, an adaptive multi-
criteria algorithm based on both voltage and current measurements is proposed. To
operate, pick-up limits of both voltage and DOC functions have to be exceeded, and
the time delay for operation depends on the magnitude of the voltage dip. Adaptivity
of the algorithm means that the pick-up limit of the DOC measurement is updated
by the microgrid management system to take into account the fault current feeding
capability of DER units connected to the corresponding LV feeder. Furthermore,
when both pick-up limits are exceeded a disconnect signal is sent to all PD4s, i.e.
DER units, of the corresponding LV feeder, as well as an interlocking signal to all
other PD2s to ensure selectivity. [37] Another option for LV feeder protection with
only voltage relays would be the comparison of voltage measurements between PD2s
some distance away from the MV/LV substation using high speed communication.
This way lower voltages at the faulted feeder could be seen more clearly. [48]
PD3 is responsible for the customer protection. PD3a, located at the service connec-
tion of the customer, is equipped with a miniature circuit breaker (MCB) or a SS in
case of a very sensitive customer microgrid, and contains a non-directional OC relay
with time-delay based selectivity with PD 2 and PD3b. Customer protection PD3b
should operate in customer faults only, and can use a traditional fuse protection
with customer connections up to 3x40A, after which e.g. MCBs are required. While
communication capabilities are not directly necessary from protection point of view,
selectivity with PD2 may be hard to achieve in reality without interlocking signals
between PD3a and PD2 [48]. Additionally, communication with the smart energy
meter at customer site will be needed for advanced metering infrastructure (AMI)
applications.
Finally, PD4 is used for DG unit protection, and contains both voltage and fre-
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quency measurements like PD1. To avoid unnecessary tripping and disconnection
of DG units, the voltage relay has time-delay based selectivity with both PD1 and
PD2. In the same manner the frequency relay has selectivity with PD 1, to ensure
DG units won't disconnect in an utility grid fault when the microgrid is transitioning
to islanded mode. If the DG unit consists of a directly connected rotating generator
(synchronous generator), a synchronism check relay is required to connect to the
microgrid during normal or island operation. As mentioned, PD4 receives a transfer
trip signal from PD2 when PD2 operates. Additionally, the microgrid management
system can send a disconnection signal to PD4 based on operational needs, and in
a case where island operation of the microgrid is not possible, loss-of-mains pro-
tection is proposed to be achieved by a disconnection signal from the MV feeder
protection [48]. The economical feasibility of communication based LoM-protection
at each LV DG unit is questionable. Alternative local LoM methods include passive
methods monitoring power system variables, such as rate of change of frequency
(ROCOF) protection, and active methods, where a disturbance is injected and its
eﬀect on grid parameters is examined to detect islanding [76].
As discussed in Section 3.1.3, the operation curves of diﬀerent protection devices
also deﬁne the fault ride-through (FRT) requirements of DER units, i.e. the oper-
ation limits in which the unit should still operate normally without disconnection.
They are chosen so that the stability of the microgrid or the healthy part of it can
be maintained after fault clearance also with directly connected synchronous ma-
chines connected to the microgrid. As such, the operation curve for voltage relay
of PD1 in normal operation and PD2 in island operation represent the voltage FRT
requirements for DER units, while the frequency relay of PD4 represent the fre-
quency FRT requirements. The technical design of DG unit converters must enable
both these FRT requirements as well as the conditional loss-of-mains protection
mentioned earlier.
With this, the general requirements for microgrid protection have been summarized
as:
1. Adaptation capability
2. Utilization of high-speed standard-based communication (e.g. IEC 61850)
3. High-speed operation in deep voltage dips to maintain stability in the healthy
part of the network as well as to fulﬁll the needs of very sensitive customers
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4. Selective operation in all kinds of faults
5. Unnecessary operation of protection devices and disconnections of DG units
must be avoided. [48]
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4. IEC 61850 IN DER APPLICATIONS
With the development of microprocessor based numerical relays, a new evolution of
power system secondary equipment replaced the single-function electromechanical
or static devices and their hard-wired relay logic. These new intelligent electronic
devices (IEDs) made it possible to ﬁt more functions into fewer devices, the need
for wiring was reduced and the communication capabilities allowed to access more
information remotely. Initially proprietary communication protocols developed by
each manufacturer were used, and costly protocol converters were needed if using
IEDs from diﬀerent vendors. These converters also introduced new problems in the
form of errors and only partial functionality. Integration with the supervisory control
and data acquisiton (SCADA) systems was moderately successful if the end user
could lock into a solution from a single vendor, while multi-vendor systems invariably
led to issues [77]. From these experiences the need for standardization to support
interoperability of IEDs from diﬀerent manufacturers was born. Interoperability
in this context, as deﬁned by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
means "the ability of two or more IEDs from the same vendor, or from diﬀerent
vendors, to exchange information and use that information for correct execution of
speciﬁed functions" [78].
With this goal in mind, IEC 61850 was designed as a joint eﬀort between EPRI/IEEE
and IEC TC 57 (technical committee 57) in 1997 in order to combine the earlier
work of both groups and deﬁne an international standard to enable substation de-
vices from diﬀerent vendors to share data, services and functions [77]. The result
of this work was a 14-part standard series IEC 61850 "Communication Networks
and Systems in Substation Automation", published between 2002 and 2005. As the
title suggests, these standards were exclusively designed for substation automation
systems. However, the core aspects of IEC 61850 apply to automation in general
and the scope of the standard family has later been extended to several other ap-
plication areas as well. This was also reﬂected in a new name for the standard:
"Communication Networks and Systems for Power Utility Automation".
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Nowadays the use of IEC 61850 is widespread in new installations and it is viewed as
one of the core standards in the IEC Smart Grid Standardization Roadmap, having
"an enormous eﬀect on any Smart Grid application and solution", and being seen
as part of the backbone of the future smart grid [6]. Although dominant in modern
installations, it is worth noting the current power system automation installed earlier
is generally not retro-ﬁtted for IEC 61850 and is still mostly using older protocols
such as Modbus for ﬁeld automation.
All but one of the original parts of the series (Part 2: Glossary) have been updated
to edition 2 [79]. Although the original parts are sometimes referred to as IEC 61850
Edition 1 and the revised parts as IEC 61850 Edition 2, it should be noted that the
edition numbering is used for individual parts, not the whole standard. For example
the new extensions accepted to the standard are marked as ed1.0 [79], and as such
using edition numbering for the whole standard can lead to confusions and is not
advised. This chapter ﬁrst presents the most important principles and concepts of
the standard. Then an overview of the usage of IEC 61850 in DER applications is
presented and, closely relating to this, the published extensions of the standard are
examined.
4.1 IEC 61850 overview
4.1.1 Objectives
The objective of IEC 61850 in standardizing the power utility automation systems
(PUAS) is to develop a communication standard that meets the necessary functional,
non-functional and performance requirements, while supporting future technologi-
cal developments [78]. This means the standard has to consider the operational
requirements throughout the power grid, but not standardize or limit in any way
the functions involved in power system operation or their allocation within the
PUAS. Application functions do still need to be identiﬁed and described in order to
deﬁne their interfaces and communication requirements. Other important goals for
the standard include:
1. existing standards and commonly accepted principles should be used to the
maximum possible extent
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2. the protocols used should be open and extensible with new functionality
3. the oﬀered communication services can be mapped to diﬀerent state-of-the-art
protocols
4. the complete topology of an electrical system, the generated and consumed
information and the information ﬂow between all IEDs is speciﬁed using a
machine readable language. [78]
4.1.2 Approach
To achieve the goals mentioned above, three methods have been adopted to the
approach of the IEC 61850 series: functional decomposition, information modelling
and data ﬂow modelling [78]. Functional decomposition means the division of a
task performed by the automation system into smaller parts. The granularity of
the decomposition is ruled by the communication behaviour i.e. the data exchange
involved in performing the function. It is presented in the standard by logical nodes
(LNs), the smallest parts of a function that exchange data. Information modelling
is used to deﬁne the abstract syntax and semantics of the actual information ex-
changed, and consists of data object classes and types, attributes, abstract object
methods (services), and their relationships. The whole data structure will be ex-
amined in detail in Section 4.2. Data ﬂow modelling on the other hand deﬁnes the
communication interfaces enabling the exchange of information between distributed
functional components and the associated functional performance requirements.
The separation of the information model from data ﬂow is an important feature
of IEC 61850. Actual communication technologies evolve rapidly compared to the
power system equipment with lifespans of typically tens of years. To achieve the
decoupling of communication and the data model, a set of abstract services and
objects are speciﬁed. This way applications can be written independent from a
speciﬁc protocol, making it possible to use the current state-of-the-art protocols
(goal 3 above), as well as to cope with the diversity of communication solutions in
the widening scope of IEC 61850. These abstract services and their mappings to
speciﬁc protocols are discussed in Section 4.3. To satisfy goal 4, a formal language
named System Conﬁguration description Language (SCL) is deﬁned to exchange
IED capability and system level descriptions.
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The main functions, referred to as application functions in the standard [78], of a
power utility automation system are control, supervision, protection and monitoring
of the primary equipment and the power grid. Other functions, referred to as system
functions, are related to the automation system itself, such as the supervision of
communication. As mentioned, the standard does not specify any ﬁxed allocation
of functions to IEDs or diﬀerent control levels. This is because the desired allocation
can depend on many diﬀerent factors like availability and performance requirements,
cost constraints, state-of-the-art technology, a utility's philosophy and so on. A
function that is split in modules performed by diﬀerent IEDs that communicate
with each other is called a distributed function.
4.1.3 Structure
The current IEC 61850 standard series (IEC 61850:2015 SER) contains 24 parts in
total [79]. The overview of the parts and links between them are presented in Figure
4.1. Parts 1-5 describe the general requirements and system aspects. IEC 61850-1
covers a short overview and introduction to the standard. IEC 61850-2 provides
a glossary of terms used in other parts. IEC 61850-3 deﬁnes the general require-
ments mainly regarding construction, design and environmental conditions of utility
communication and automation IEDs and systems. IEC 61850-4 covers system and
project management aspects like engineering requirements, system lifecycles and
quality assurance. IEC 61850-5 describes communication requirements for functions
and device models, including e.g. communication quality aspects like transfer time,
time synchronization, data integrity, security and dependability classes, as well as
the performance classes required by diﬀerent message types. IEC 61850-6 deﬁnes the
SCL conﬁguration description language and provides an overview on the intended
system engineering process.
IEC 61850-7-1 is an introduction to the overarching modeling paradigm for data
and communication models used in other IEC 61850-7-x parts as well as their rela-
tions to other parts like 61850-5 and the concrete protocol mappings of 61850-8-x
and 61850-9-x. IEC 61850-7-2 describes the abstract communication service inter-
face (ACSI) for accessing and exchanging infromation. IEC 61850-7-3 contains the
Common Data Classes (CDCs) which are the basic types of information used in
modeling like a 3-phase measured value or a single point status. These CDCs make
up the standardized, normative logical nodes (LNs) deﬁned in IEC 61850-7-4 and its
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Figure 4.1 Overview of the IEC 61850 series content [78].
domain speciﬁc extensions 7-4xx. The 61850-7-5xx parts act as informative appli-
cation guidelines for speciﬁc domains, describing how to implement the application
functions using the other 7-x parts. 61850-8-x documents are normative deﬁnitions
of the ACSI mapping to real protocols excluding communication related to sampled
values, which have their own dedicated mappings in parts 61850-9-x. IEC 61850-10
speciﬁes techniques for conformance testing. Finally, the IEC 61850-80-x parts are
additional informative Technical Speciﬁcations (TS) related to communication map-
ping to other protocols like Modbus or IEC 60870-5-101/104, and the 61850-90-x
are additional informative Technical Reports (TR) for further enhancements and
extensions of the IEC 61850 domain like communication between substations and
control centers and transmitting synchrophasor information. As can be seen, the
IEC 61850 series is much more than a traditional communication protocol deﬁnition.
Taking into account system aspects like project management as well as engineering
guidelines, extendability and deﬁning a common conﬁguration language, the series
aims to ensure a very high level of interoperability at application level that can
adapt to a changing communication infrastructure.
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4.1.4 Envisioned beneﬁts and current experiences
Movement to IEC 61850 from legacy systems is envisioned to incur many beneﬁts
in both engineering and operation capability of power utility automation systems.
Obvious beneﬁts include reduced installation costs in moving from hardwiring to
LAN-based networking, but the features of IEC 61850 are also intended to reduce
engineering costs in many ways. Transducer information can be sent from one to
many devices using sampled values, reducing transducer costs. Extensive manual
conﬁguration with every relay is not needed during commissioning with the SCL
conﬁguration language and object-oriented data structure, and SCL can also be
used to deﬁne unambiguous user requirements in the procurement phase. Common
naming conventions and deﬁned behaviour reduce migration costs between diﬀerent
brands of devices and require less reconﬁguration with hardware changes. Extensions
to add new functionality or devices into existing systems have minimal eﬀect on
existing equipment. Integration to other utility systems is easier without the need for
separate communication front-ends, remote terminal units (RTUs) or reconﬁguration
of devices. The interconnectedness of all devices in the same network can also
open capabilities in for example new substation-wide protection schemes. [80] IEC
61850 has been designed with very much the same goals in mind as envisioned for
future smart grids compared to old power systems, such as reduced costs, ﬂexibility,
extendability and interoperability. [81]
While multi-vendor interoperability is seen as an important goal for the standard,
practical experiences as mentioned in for example [82], [83] and [84] have shown that
some deﬁnitions of the standard are loose enough that IEDs passing the conformance
test for IEC 61850 is not a guarantee of seamless interoperability. Especially with the
expansion to new application areas, attention must be paid to the amount of time
and eﬀort required in engineering and conﬁguration of wide IEC 61850 systems [85].
With the development and maturation of the standard, protocol interoperability
issues are becoming less and less commonplace, but attention still needs to be paid
to the data model, management, engineering and conﬁguration process of multi-
vendor environments [86].
4.2 Information model
The presentation of information in the IEC 61850 series follows the popular concepts
of object-oriented data modeling, where diﬀerent objects encapsulating 1) data and
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2) methods are the basic units of the system. These objects are instances of classes,
which group similar objects together and describe their common functionality. Ob-
jects, containing other objects, form a hierarchical data structure that describes
all the system functionality at the wanted level. A more thorough introduction to
object-oriented methods and programming can be found in for example [87].
In its modelling approach of real world devices, IEC 61850 creates a virtualization
of a device to provide a view of those aspects that are of interest for the informa-
tion exchange with other devices. Only those details that are required to achieve
interoperability are deﬁned in the standard. [88] As mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, IEC 61850 uses functional decomposition to break down the application func-
tions of an automation system to smaller parts. The chosen approach and resulting
object hierarchy are presented in Figure 4.2. A physical device (IED) is divided
into logical devices (LDs), virtual entities used for grouping typical automation,
protection or other functions. A logical device contains the basic building blocks
of the IEC 61850 information model: standardized logical nodes (LNs) deﬁned in
the IEC 61850-7-4xx parts. Finally, LNs contain a list of data representing some
application-speciﬁc meaning, each with their own dedicated data attributes.
As stated, a logical device is a virtual entity that exists to enable aggregation of
related logical nodes. The concept is introduced mainly for communication pur-
poses beyond a logical node, and as such a LD is a composition of logical nodes and
additional services. These services include for example deﬁning setting groups, sam-
pled value exchange and fast Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE)
messaging, discussed further in Section 4.3. The grouping of logical nodes in logical
devices is based on common features of the LNs, such as them normally being in the
same operating mode (e.g. on/oﬀ/test mode). The standard does not specify how
to arrange LDs in a physical device apart from the limitation that a logical device
can't be spread over many IEDs. Example of a typical logical device could be a sub-
station bay unit, where the LNs are related by their position in the power system.
As for real world IED implementations, the REF615 relays used in the case study of
Chapter 5 contain up to four logical devices: CTRL for actual control equipment,
DR for disturbance recorder, LD0 for protection and other functions and MU01 if
a merging unit for sampled values is included [89], while for example VAMP relays
use only one logical device in a single IED for all LNs [90].
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Figure 4.2 IEC 61850 data modelling [78].
4.2.1 Logical nodes
Logical nodes and the data contained in them are the fundamental concepts that
are used in IEC 61850 to describe real systems and their functions [88]. In order
to fulﬁll the requirements set for IEC 61850, especially aspects of interoperability
and arbitrary allocation and distribution of functions between devices, the data of
all functions needed to be grouped in objects with a high level semantic meaning.
Logical nodes can be seen as containers for a set of data provided by a speciﬁc
function for communication [71]. Said function may be constructed from multiple
logical nodes, residing in one or many diﬀerent physical devices. Logical nodes are
grouped according to the applications they're related to, as shown in Table 4.1. They
have standardized four letter names specifying exactly what part of the system the
LN describes, with the group indicator always being the ﬁrst letter of the name.
Additionally, an application speciﬁc preﬁx and a numeric suﬃx can be added to the
name for identiﬁcation. Some examples of logical nodes presenting real applications
include a diﬀerential protection function (PDIF), a circuit breaker (XCBR), a switch
(XSWI) or a current transformer (TCTR). There are also "administrative" LNs for
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containing information like nameplate and self-supervision data about the physical
device used as the host (LPHD), or common data for all LNs in a logical device
(LLN0). IEC 61850 also has well-deﬁned rules for deﬁning additional logical nodes
and data for new functions or application domains.
Table 4.1 Logical node groups [88]
Group indicator Logical node group
A Automatic control
C Supervisory control
D DER (Distributed Energy Resources)
F Functional blocks
G Generic function references
H Hydro power
I Interfacing and archiving
K Mechanical and non-electrical primary equipment
L System logical nodes
M Metering and measurement
P Protection functions
Q Power quality events detection related
R Protection related functions
S Supervision and monitoring
T Instrument transformer and sensors
W Wind power
X Switchgear
Y Power transformer and related functions
Z Further (power system) equipment
The mean number of speciﬁc data in logical nodes originally deﬁned in IEC 61850-7-4
is approximately 20. This information provided by the logical nodes can generally
be divided into 5 categories:
1. Common logical node information: information independent from the dedi-
cated function represented by the LN, such as external equipment name plate
2. Status information: information representing the status of the process or the
function represented by the LN, such as local/remote control, operation capa-
bility or operation counter
3. Settings: information needed for the function of the logical node, such as
operation time, delay or pickup value of a protection function
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4. Measured values: measured or calculated analogue data related to the function
like total active power of a measurement or sum of switched amperes for a
circuit breaker
5. Controls: data which are changed by commands, like switchgear position,
block closing or resettable counters.
As an example, the structure of the mentioned XCBR logical node representing a
circuit breaker according to IEC 61850-7-4 is presented in Table 4.2. The common
data class column deﬁnes the structure of the data object, and is discussed later
in this section. The column T would indicate a transient data object having only
momentary validity for its state, while the column M/O/C deﬁnes whether the data
object is mandatory (M), optional (O) or conditional (C) for an instance of the LN.
The whole XCBR LN is made of a total of 16 data objects.
4.2.2 Data, data attributes and common data classes
The data in a logical node are not of simple basic types like an integer or an enu-
meration, but are further made up from speciﬁc data attributes. The XCBR LN has
data named Pos belonging to the controls category that describes the position of
the circuit breaker. The actual position of the breaker is stored in the data attribute
Pos.stVal, having four possible states of on, oﬀ, intermediate-state or bad-state. In
addition to the actual value, the status of the position includes other data attributes
as well: quality Pos.q describing the validity of stVal, timestamp Pos.t showing
the last change of it, originator Pos.origin having information about the originator
that issued the last command to control the position and Pos.ctlNum storing the
control number given by the originator in its request. The values of stVal and quality
can also be remotely substituted, and an own set of data attributes are deﬁned for
substitution. Furthermore, several data attributes are deﬁned for the conﬁguration
of the control behaviour of Pos such as control pulse conﬁguration or control model.
All in all, 24 data attributes make up the Pos data object of the XCBR logical node.
Data attributes in a data object are classiﬁed according to their usage, for example
whether they are used for description, control, measurements or conﬁguration, by
functional constraints (FC). The functional constraint is a two letter property and
deﬁnes the services allowed for the data attribute as well as its initial values. For
example the Pos.stVal attribute mentioned earlier has the FC of status information
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Table 4.2 XCBR logical node [91]
XCBR class
Data
object
name
Common
data
class
Explanation T
M/
O/
C
LNNAME The name shall be composed of the class name, the LN-
Preﬁx and LN-Instance-ID according to IEC 61850-7-2,
Clause 22.
Data objects
Descriptions
EEName DPL External equipment name plate O
Status information
EEHealth ENS External equipment health O
LocKey SPS Local or remote key (local means without substation
automation communication, hardwired direct control)
O
Loc SPS Local control behaviour M
OpCnt INS Operation counter M
CBOpCap ENS Circuit breaker operating capability O
POWCap ENS Point on wave switching capability O
MaxOpCap INS Circuit breaker operating capability when fully charged O
Dsc SPS Discrepancy O
Measured and metered values
SumSwARs BCR Sum of switched amperes, resettable O
Controls
LocSta SPC Switching authority at station level O
Pos DPC Switch position M
BlkOpn SPC Block opening M
BlkCls SPC Block closing M
ChaMotEna SPC Charger motor enabled M
Settings
CBTmms ING Closing time of breaker O
denoted by ST, and therefore its initial value is taken from the process and it is not
writable. The diﬀerent services of IEC 61850 are discussed in the next section.
Across all logical nodes, data representing similar information can be found: the
example of Pos has the prime characteristic of having four states, which is common
for other switching-speciﬁc applications. The whole set of data attributes it consists
of is standardized across the IEC 61850 series as a common data class (CDC). This
four-state information, usually represented by two bits, is known as "double point"
information, and the CDC representing it is named DPC (controllable double point).
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Common data classes are deﬁned in IEC 61850-7-3, and provide a useful means to
reduce the size of data deﬁnitions and ensure the consistency of data attribute
deﬁnitions by allowing data deﬁnitions to just reference the common data class.
CDCs deﬁne the type, functional constraints, trigger options (conditions that may
cause a report or log entry to be created), values or value ranges, and the M/O/C
deﬁnitions of every data attribute included in the CDC.
4.3 Information exchange: ACSI and SCSMs
As mentioned in Section 4.1, the decoupling of communication and the data model
is an important feature of IEC 61850. To establish independence from speciﬁc
communication protocols, the abstract communication service interface (ACSI) is
deﬁned in IEC 61850-7-2. As the information models and information exchange
services are necessarily interwoven to some extent, the ACSI consists of two types
of models: ﬁrstly it deﬁnes the meta models for the utility information models
contained in IEC 61850-7-3, 61850-7-4 and 61850-6, and secondly it deﬁnes the
information exchange service models [92].
4.3.1 Meta models
The hierarchy created by the deﬁned meta models is presented in Figure 4.3. The
ﬁrst level of deﬁnitions is the meta-meta model. This model deﬁnes the basic data
types to be used like ﬂoating points, integers and diﬀerent strings, but also the
CommonACSITypes used for the attribute deﬁnitions of the classes in subsequent mod-
els, like the unique instance path-name ObjectReference. From these types, the
meta model is constructed, deﬁning the generic models that make up the information
model presented in Section 4.2. This means formally deﬁning the attributes and ser-
vices of overall classes like GenServerClass, GenLogicalDeviceClass, GenLogical-
NodeClass and GenDataObjectClass. [92] The speciﬁc LNs, CDCs and other struc-
tures in parts 7-3 and 7-4 like a XCBR logical node or a DPC common data class
are instances of these generic classes, and form the domain type model. Finally,
a model of an actual IED is an instance of the domain type model providing the
actual data representing the virtualized view of the real world device or application.
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Figure 4.3 The conceptual models of IEC 61850 [92].
4.3.2 Information exchange modelling classes
The other part of ACSI, information exchange modelling classes, provide services
operating on data objects, data attributes and data sets, and are grouped in Table
4.3 according to their usage. DATA-SET is a class deﬁned in ACSI that permits
the grouping of data objects and data attributes, easing their use for information
exchange. Data-sets can be constructed using the functional constraints mentioned
in Section 4.2. An ordered collection of data attributes having the same FC is called
functional constrained data (FCD), while a reference to a single data attribute, sub
data object or sub data attribute of a data object having a speciﬁc FC is called a
functional constrained data attribute (FCDA). Data-sets are deﬁned as an ordered
group of FCDs and FCDAs organized as a single collection for the convenience of a
client. For example, all measured values of a data object with (FC = MX) can be
referenced by the measurement FCD to create a data-set for reporting to clients.
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Table 4.3 Information exchange modelling classes [92].
Setting group control Class deﬁning services for switching from one set of setting
values to another and editing these setting groups.
Report control Classes controlling the procedures required for reporting values
of data objects from one or more logical nodes to one client.
Logging Classes for the storage of historical values of data objects and
their retrieval over communications systems.
Control blocks for generic
substation events (GSE)
Class for fast and reliable system-wide distribution of input
and output values in generic object oriented substation event
(GOOSE) messages.
Control block for transmis-
sion of sampled values
Classes for time-controlled and cyclic transmission of sampled
values in unicast or multicast.
Control Services to change the state of internal and external processes
by a client.
Time and time synchroniza-
tion
Model for providing UTC synchronized time to to applications
in utility IEDs
File system Class for transferring and management of ﬁles and ﬁle stores.
Tracking Classes for storing the service parameters used by a service for
logging or reporting of information.
The groups of Table 4.3 consist of one or more class deﬁnitions, whose attributes
contain mainly IDs or references to objects or data sets, and the main focus is
on the deﬁned services. The service deﬁnitions include requests and both negative
and positive responses if applicable, as well as parameters associated with them.
The concept of control blocks is present in many instances like setting groups, re-
porting, logging, GSE and sampled values. A control block is a class deﬁned very
similarly to data object classes, but while data objects are used as an interface to ap-
plication level functions, the control blocks conﬁgure the associated communication
services [92]. Additionally, the CONTROL class used for actually manipulating the pro-
cesses needs to provide diﬀerent behaviours of the control object depending on the
application. Therefore it deﬁnes four diﬀerent state machines describing the opera-
tion in corresponding control modes: direct or select-before-operate (SBO) control
with normal or enhanced security. The SBO mode ﬁrst tries to select the control
object to ensure multiple clients cannot operate on the same object simultaneously,
while enhanced security means the control object provides additional supervision
of the status value to be controlled. Models for utility functions like time and ﬁle
system have a deﬁned semantic but are limited in scope of the standard to allow
speciﬁc communication service mapping (SCSM) presentation and restrictions. All
the services can be tracked using the diﬀerent tracking service classes, providing
the necessary service parameter information for logging or reporting of the wanted
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information exchange services.
4.3.3 Application associations
The GenServerClass deﬁned in the meta model represents the external visible be-
haviour of a device, and hosts all other ACSI models. The server has two possi-
ble roles regarding information exchange: communicating with a client, and send-
ing information to peer devices [92]. Most service models in IEC 61850 use the
client/server architecture, where the server provides data and services to the client
upon receiving a request or spontaneously according to predeﬁned rules. A same
device can implement both server and client roles according to need. The ACSI
also deﬁnes an abstract interface for fast and reliable system-wide event distribu-
tion between an application in one device and many remote applications in other
devices, as well as transmission of sampled measured values in the same way. This
communication happens with a unidirectional publisher/subscriber pattern, where
the publisher sends its messages as a multicast i.e. one-to-many distribution, and
all other applications interested in the information can subscribe to it to receive the
messages. A multicast message diﬀers profoundly from a broadcast message, the
other form of one-to-many distribution: a broadcast message is sent to the whole
network and processed by all its devices, while multicast is sent to a logical group
of devices and processed only by those devices. It should be noted that many of
the services and structures in the standard are optional. For a simple device, the
server may comprise of just one logical device with a single control model and no
other services. Furthermore, the exact relationship of the server and the underlying
communication system is outside the scope of ACSI, and depends on the speciﬁc
communication service mappings (SCSMs) discussed later.
The two types of information exchange are realized in ACSI by an application associ-
ation model. It consists of 1) class deﬁnitions for associations and 2) access control
concepts, providing mechanisms for establishing and maintaining connections be-
tween devices and for restricting access to instances in a server. Two application
association classes are deﬁned: the TWO-PARTY-APPLICATION-ASSOCIATION (TPAA)
for the bidirectional client/server information exchange, and the MULTICAST-APPLI-
CATION-ASSOCIATION (MCAA) for unidirectional publisher/subscriber information
exchange. These application associations are part of the GenServerClass attributes,
and each of them identiﬁes one client or a subscriber with which the server maintains
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an association. The diﬀerent services deﬁned in the information modelling classes
presented in Section 4.3.2 are available in the application associations.
The diﬀerence between the two classes can be seen from Figure 4.4, where the con-
nection services used by them to initiate data transfer are compared. A TPAA
is connection-oriented and initiated with the Associate-service, as well as released
gracefully (completing unﬁnished actions) with the Release-service, or abruptly (ter-
minating instantly) with the Abort-service. In a MCAA each exchange of infor-
mation carries association parameters and data, and the "application association"
ceases as soon as the service has been processed. The ﬁgure is also representative of
the intended use of MCAAs in wide-scale distribution of time-critical, periodic in-
formation. These services include sending generic substation event (GSE) messages
and the multicast of sampled values, and are discussed in the next section.
Figure 4.4 The client/server (TPAA) and publisher/subscriber (MCAA) service models
of ACSI [92].
4.3.4 GOOSE messages and sampled values
The GSE model is based on autonomous decentralization and provides fast and
reliable system-wide distribution of input and output values. It should be noted that
achieving the minimal transmission delay and reliability aspects are dependent on
the mapping and implementation of the communication stack. The GSE originally
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consisted of two diﬀerent types of messages, but the generic substation state event
(GSSE) used to convey state change information in bit pairs has been deprecated
and is kept in the standard as an annex only for backwards compatibility. The
remaining generic object oriented substation event (GOOSE) model supports the
exchange of a wide range of possible common data organized in a data-set. GOOSE
messages are used for time-critical messages especially related to protection, such as
interlocks, blocks and transfer trips between protective relays.
The overview of involved classes and services is presented in Figure 4.5. In the upper
part a normal ACSI service of GetDataValues deﬁned in GenDataObjectClass is
used to retrieve the values of a data object. In the lower part the GOOSE mechanism
is presented. The GOOSE messages are conﬁgured by 1) deﬁning an appropriate
data-set, using FCDs and FCDAs as discussed in Section 4.2, and 2) by deﬁning
a GOOSE control block (GoCB) for setting up the GOOSE services to be used
on the data-set. If the value of one or several members of the data-set changes,
the transmission buﬀer of the publisher is updated with the local service "publish",
transmitting all values with a GOOSE message. SCSM speciﬁc services will then
update the reception buﬀer of the subscribers, and the new values received are
signalled to the application locally.
In addition to the status or value changes, GOOSE messages contain also the time
of the last change allowing a receiving device to set local timers related to a given
event. As can be seen, the buﬀers and update mechanisms used are outside the
scope of ACSI, and are a local issue to be implemented complying with the services
deﬁned. Finally, the SetGoCBValues service can be used to modify the settings of
the control block. In addition to value changes, GOOSE messages are sent upon
newly activating a device as an initial message, as well as continuously with a longer
cycle time even if no value change has occurred to 1) be able to notice communication
failures and 2) ensure that other newly activated devices will know the current status
values of the publisher device.
The transmission of sampled values is based on a similar structure as presented in
Figure 4.5 for GOOSE messages. Special attention for sampled values is required
with regard to the time constraints, so that the combined jitter of sampling and
transmission is minimized to a suﬃcient degree that allows an unambiguous alloca-
tion of the samples, times, and sequence [92]. As with GOOSE, a sampled value
control block is deﬁned for controlling the transmission of a speciﬁed data-set. The
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Figure 4.5 The classes and services of the GOOSE model [92].
transmission happens at the speciﬁed sample rate, and can be done either as multi-
cast, using the MCAA, or as unicast, using the TPAA.
4.3.5 Speciﬁc Communication Service Mappings (SCSMs)
All in all, the IEC 61850-7-X parts deﬁne abstract information (7-3 and 7-4) and
service (7-2) models for power utility automation systems. While ACSI deﬁnes ser-
vices, requests, responses and parameters associated with them, it does not deﬁne
concrete ACSI messages to be sent between devices. Instead, for communication
purposes the ACSI services are always mapped to the Open Systems Interconnec-
tion (OSI) model for communication functions via a speciﬁc communication service
mapping (SCSM). A thorough introduction to the OSI model deﬁned in ISO/IEC
7498-1 can be found in for example [93]. While the fast GOOSE messages and
sampled values are mapped directly to the data link layer for minimum processing
and maximum speed, other communication uses the full OSI stack and maps the
ACSI services to application layer messages. The application layer (AL) is the level
that then uses speciﬁc protocols and produces the actual application layer protocol
data units (AL PDUs) to be sent over communication media. The mapping and the
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application layer used deﬁne the concrete encoding and syntax for the data to be
exchanged. This mapping allows ACSI to be applied to diﬀerent application layers
with diﬀerent features. Furthermore, the lower layers of transport, network, data
link and physical media protocols used are invariant to the form of the services and
data oﬀered, and vice versa: the application sending and receiving data is largely
invariant to the mechanisms of information transfer used. This separation of roles
makes it possible to employ many diﬀerent technologies in a relatively transparent
manner, and exchange the lower layers of communication as needed. The obvious
beneﬁt is that networks with diﬀerent types of physical media may be used, but also
the same physical network and protocols may be used by more than one application
layer protocol.
The relation of ACSI, SCSMs and OSI layers is depicted in Figure 4.6. SCSMs
deﬁne how the services and models presented earlier like server, logical devices,
logical nodes, data, data sets, control blocks, GOOSE messages and so forth are
implemented using a speciﬁc communication stack. SCSMs are deﬁned in the IEC
61850-8-X and IEC 61850-9-X parts. The 8-X parts cover all communication except
that related to sampled values, which is covered in the 9-X parts. Two widely used
SCSMs include IEC 61850-8-1 for mapping to MMS (ISO/IEC 9506-1 and ISO/IEC
9506-2) and ISO/IEC 8802-3 (Ethernet), and IEC 61850-9-2 for transmission of
sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3. A Publicly Available Speciﬁcation (PAS)
IEC/PAS 61850-9-3 is also issued as a pre-standard for precision time protocol proﬁle
for power utility automation [94].
The Manufacturing Message Speciﬁcation (MMS) is an international standard used
for transferring real time process data and supervisory control information between
networked devices. Mackiewicz states in [80] that MMS was chosen for use in Utility
Communication Architecture (UCA) back in 1991, an architecture later serving
as foundation for IEC 61850, because "it supports complex named objects and a
rich set of ﬂexible services", providing straightforward mapping with IEC 61850.
Many concepts of the standard have a straight correspondence to MMS classes,
like logical nodes, data objects and data attributes being presented by MMS named
variables and their structured components, or logs being presented by MMS journals.
However, it is not always necessary for ACSI services to be supported directly in all
application layers. For example, ACSI has the service GetDataSetValues returning
values of multiple data, while an AL may provide a "Get"-function for single data
only. In this case the mapping has to issue several "Get"-functions to implement
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Figure 4.6 ACSI mapping to communication stacks [78].
the GetDataSetValues service, but maintains compatibility with ACSI even without
direct support of the AL. [88] While MMS is run on top of a normal TCP/IP stack,
GOOSE messages in IEC 61850-8-1 as well as sampled values in IEC 61850-9-2 are
mapped directly to Ethernet frames (ISO/IEC 8802-3). This eliminates processing
of any middle layers and improves performance.
As for other possible SCSMs, the IEC 61400-25 standard that applies IEC 61850
methodology for wind turbines includes also mappings to Web Services, OPC XML,
IEC 60870-5-104 and DNP3 [95], but as of yet these mappings are not extended
to be part of the IEC 61850 series. Instead, the IEC technical committee TC 57
published a technical report IEC TR 61850-80-3 in November 2015 with the title
"Mapping to web protocols - Requirements and technical choices" examining the
use of Web Protocols as a new communication mapping (SCSM) for the IEC 61850
standard. The need for the new SCSM was speciﬁcally to address smart grid speciﬁc
challenges and use cases. The report ﬁrst presents a collection of use cases for
emerging smart grid architectures and applications as a new extension of the scope
of IEC 61850, and charts the requirements associated with the use cases of various
domains like PV, hydro, thermal, CHP and wind generation, E-Mobility, smart
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customers and microgrids. The report considered six diﬀerent candidates for the web
protocol mapping: IEC 62541 (OPC UA), IEC 61400-25-4 annex A (Web services
proﬁle for wind power), DPWS (Devices Proﬁle for Web Services), RESTful Web
Services, XML messaging over Websocket and XMPP (Extensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol). Of these candidates XMPP was chosen, with key beneﬁts listed
as cyber-security, IPv6 support co-existing with IPv4, presence monitoring for use in
dynamic or intermittent communications, and usage in other existing or upcoming
standards. [96] The SCSM for mapping to XMPP is currently being worked on as
IEC 61850-8-2, with forecasted publication date of April 2017 [97].
4.4 IEC 61850 and Distributed Energy Resources
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the original scope of IEC 61850
series of substation communications has been widened to apply to other parts of
power utility automation as well. This is achieved by publishing extensions based
on the same concepts as the core standard, but applying those concepts on a new
area of power system applications. Examples of published extensions include the
aforementioned IEC 61400-25 for wind power plants as part of the IEC 61400 stan-
dard series on wind power, and IEC 61850-7-410 and 61850-7-510 for hydroelectric
power plants as extensions to the original series. The extensions include additional
application speciﬁc logical nodes, such as in IEC 61850-7-410, and guidelines on how
to use the new deﬁned logical nodes as well as the other parts of IEC 61850 series
in order to model the respective applications, as in IEC 61850-7-510.
In 2009, the extension IEC 61850-7-420: "Basic communication structure - Dis-
tributed energy resources logical nodes" was published with the goal of establishing
IEC 61850 as the common standard for the exchange of information with DER
units. According to the scope of the standard, this comprises "dispersed generation
devices and dispersed storage devices, including reciprocating engines, fuel cells, mi-
croturbines, photovoltaics, combined heat and power, and energy storage" [98]. The
standard does not however limit its scope to the modelling of the actual DER units,
but takes a more holistic approach: in addition to the internal parameters of DER
units and the associated power converters, special attention is paid to the connection
of the DER units to local systems as well as the utility network. An overview of
the usage of new and existing logical nodes as well as potential groupings to logical
devices in a DER system is presented in Figure 4.7. The DER related logical nodes
have their own group indicator D.
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Figure 4.7 Conceptual organization of DER logical devices and logical nodes [98].
In its approach to modelling the connection of DER units, IEC 61850-7-420 deﬁnes
two terms: DER plant and electrical connection point (ECP). DER plant is deﬁned
as "one DER unit and/or a group of DER units which are connected at an electri-
cal connection point (ECP)" [98]. An ECP is then deﬁned as a logical device that
"deﬁnes the characteristics of the DER plant at the point of electrical connection
between one or more DER units and any electric power system" [98]. Electric power
systems include isolated loads, microgrids and the utility power system, and usually
a switch or a circuit breaker is present at the point of an ECP. The ECPs may there-
fore have a hierarchical structure: a DER unit can have an ECP connecting it to a
local bus with other DER units, the bus can have an ECP connecting it to the local
power system with loads and the local power system can have an ECP connecting
it to the utility power system. The lastly mentioned ECP between local and utility
power systems is of speciﬁc interest in microgrid applications, since it is identical
to the point of common coupling (PCC) of the microgrid discussed in Chapter 2.
The deﬁned ECP related logical nodes can contain information on the DER plant
contractual and operational characteristics, like possible operating modes, economic
dispatch parameters, schedules and operational authorities of diﬀerent roles regard-
ing the DER plant control. The ECP information assumes the "DER plant" i.e.
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a single DER unit or a collection of units can be described uniformly at the ECP:
for example with a single mode of operation like constant watts, or with uniform
operational authorities. The deﬁned LNs are provided to be used as necessary and
may or may not be implemented in any speciﬁc ECP, so for example the PCC
and all possible microgrid management regarding diﬀerent units is not restricted
to being described as a simple collection of mostly enumeration- and range-based
LNs, but rather they should be used if appropriate. Possible legacy logical nodes
of IEC 61850-7-4 to be used include an LN of the switching device at the ECP
(CSWI, XCBR) as well as measurement LNs for actual power system measurements
(MMXU) and interval metering information (MMTR). IEC 61850-7-420 also deﬁnes
a LN for fuses (XFUS), since they may be monitored in some DER devices.
As for individual DER units, the extension recommends a DER device controller
logical device that deﬁnes the operational characteristics of the single DER unit
regardless of the type of generator or prime mover involved. Logical nodes deﬁned
for this include
• DRCT for DER controller characteristics like nominal output power, start and
stop time delay as well as ramp load or unload rate.
• DRCS for DER controller status like ECP connection status, remote/local
mode, availability and on/oﬀ status.
• DRCC for DER supervisory control like setpoints for output active/reactive
powers, ﬁxed power factor, frequency or voltages or choosing operation modes.
Likewise, for non-storage DERs a single generator model is deﬁned regardless of the
prime mover of said generator. In addition to the generator operation (DGEN), basic
ratings (DRAT) and advanced features (DRAZ) describing the electrical control and
characteristics of the generator at the level of detail necessary, a DCST logical node
is deﬁned for costs associated with generator operations. Regular LNs possibly
needed include RSYN for synchronization, and FPID for modelling a PID regulator.
For excitation systems used to start the generator, two LNs are deﬁned: DREX for
excitation ratings like voltages and currents at no load or at rated power factor, and
DEXC for excitation controls and status information. For speed/frequency control of
generators, a DSFC logical node is provided with settings on power droop, reference
frequencies and power reserved for over- or under-frequency control.
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Since many DER units connect to the grid through a power electronic interface and
this has a signiﬁcant impact on the control and settings needed, the modelling of
these power converters is of speciﬁc interest. In IEC 61850-7-420, LNs ZRCT for
rectiﬁers and ZINV for inverters are deﬁned with both characteristic and current
status information as well as the settings to control the output setpoints and input
limits. However in 2013 IEC TC 57 released a whole technical report, IEC/TR
61850-90-7, focusing solely on the object models for power converters in DER sys-
tems. The goal of the TR is to provide means to the information exchange between
"power converter-based DER systems and the utilities, energy service providers or
other entities which are tasked with managing the volt, var, and watt capabilities
of these power converter-based systems" [99]. This TR uses existing logical nodes
of 61850-7-4 and 61850-7-420, but in some cases adds new data objects to the ex-
isting LNs, and also deﬁnes some new logical nodes. Both high level interactions,
focused on the ECP of DER systems, as well as more direct interactions between
local DER management systems and the DER controllers are identiﬁed as neces-
sary. New LNs for the ECP logical device include curve-based operational mode
commands, array for deﬁning these mode curves as well as dynamic reactive current
support, frequency-watt modes and feed-in watt-triggered modes of operation. The
local interactions happen directly with the logical nodes of controllers, generators,
power converters and other equipment as necessary, with additions of data objects
to the existing LNs rather than new logical nodes.
Speciﬁc types of DER units have their own logical nodes deﬁned in IEC 61850-7-420
for the energy converter of the primary energy source to electrical energy. A recipro-
cating engine is modelled by a DCIP LN, with settings on minimum and maximum
speeds as well as heat rate curves of the engine, controls for speed, torque and
start/stop commands as well as measured values for actual speed, torque and so
forth. A fuel cell has three logical nodes: DFCL for fuel cell speciﬁc controller
characteristics not found in DRCT, DSTK for fuel cell stack information and mea-
surements like voltage and temperatures, and DFPM for the fuel cell processing
module describing e.g. fuel types and measuring accumulated input and output en-
ergies as well as conversion eﬃciency. Photovoltaics (PV) installations vary largely
in size and power, and with diﬀering conﬁgurations the need for characteristics and
status items and their number vary accordingly. Four dedicated LNs are deﬁned:
DPVM for single PV module ratings, DPVA for PV array characteristics of varying
size, DPVC for the PV array controller maximizing the array power output and
DTRC tracking controller for following the movement of the sun.
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Combined heat and power (CHP) units are even more varied, as the term covers
multiple types of generation systems involving heat in the production of electricity,
with diﬀering production priorities and restrictions, ownerships, market interactions
as well as the prime movers of the system. Chosen approach is to model individiual
parts of CHP systems, which can then be used as needed to construct diﬀerent
conﬁgurations of CHP systems. The generator and prime mover are modelled with
the LNs mentioned earlier, and new LNs are deﬁned for the CHP system controller
(DCHC), thermal storage (DCTS) and the boiler system (DCHB). A wide range
of diﬀerent measurements may also be necessary, like pressure, temperature, ﬂow,
vibration, emission and meteorological measurements. Some are already represented
in IEC 61850-7-4, but some are also suggested in the extension, though it is noted
that they are not "complete" and due to their likely usage in many systems, the IEC
TC57 workgroup 10 (WG10) will develop the ﬁnal versions to cover all requirements
and those will be then be referenced as the oﬃcial LNs [98]. Logical nodes for
other auxiliary systems are also deﬁned in the standard. This includes fuel systems
for covering fuel characteristics as well as the delivery system for the fuel, battery
systems for modelling the battery system characteristics and the charger for the
system and some miscallenous logical nodes possibly needed by DER systems, like
a sequencer for startup or shutdown sequences or the aforementioned fuse device.
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5. CASE STUDY: ADAPTIVE PROTECTION
IN MULTIPOWER TEST ENVIRONMENT
In this chapter, the principles of adaptive microgrid protection presented in Chap-
ter 3 are demonstrated in a simple example conﬁguration of the Multipower test
environment of VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland located in Espoo, Fin-
land. The control and protection system of the environment is provided by ABB and
is implemented using IEC 61850. Still at the early stages of development, this case
study aims at proving the capabilities of implementing diverse protection schemes
for future test cases.
5.1 Multipower test environment
Multipower is an empirical research infrastructure where new technical solutions
and products for distributed energy systems can be tested in a multifunctional en-
vironment. The laboratory facilities have a strong interconnection with the VTT
research area of eﬃcient machines and vehicles. The switchgear and cable system
of 400 V AC, 50 Hz is connected to the 20 kV distribution network via 0,5 and 1
MVA transformers. The environment is located in two separate halls inside a single
building, with a cable system connecting the two busbars as needed. An example
conﬁguration of the environment is presented in Figure 5.1.
The Wärtsilä hall is largely used for motor testing and generally contains equipment
with higher ratings compared to the turbine hall. These include a 1,6 MVA diesel
generator unit, as well as adjustable resistive loads of 2-339 kW and 10-1700 kW.
Another diesel generator rated 60 kW/200 kVA is in the process of being transformed
to a movable unit. A brake dynamometer with a motor/generator rated at 570 kVA
and a 755 kVA frequency converter is also available for motor test runs. At the
turbine hall the environment is equipped with a modern IEC 61850 based control
and protection system and is envisioned to host a wide variety of diﬀerent DER
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Figure 5.1 An example conﬁguration of the Multipower test environment.
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units as well as being capable of islanded microgrid operation. Ongoing installations
include a micro-scale PV system of 750 W with environmental measurements and
a grid emulator CINERGIA GE30 as an alternative feed-in source to the actual
distribution network connection. Rated at 400 V and 30 kVA, the emulator is
capable of generating diﬀerent grid conditions as well as injecting disturbances such
as balanced and unbalanced voltage dips, harmonics and frequency ﬂuctuations to
the network [100]. Test sites for energy storage of 35 kW and external units up
to 100 kVA are also available. The control and protection system consists of an
ABB COM600 grid automation controller and four REF615 feeder protection IEDs.
Communication network based on Ethernet includes an industrial switch and a GPS
time synchronization server using the Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP).
5.2 Adaptive protection scheme and implementation
One of the most important conﬁguration changes in a microgrid is the transition
between grid-connected and islanded mode of operation, potentially presenting two
very diﬀerent sets of operating conditions. This may raise the need for adaptive
protection discussed in Section 3.3, including adapting the protection of DER units
to solve issues examined in Section 3.1.3. With communication capabilities between
the IED located at the PCC of the microgrid and other microgrid IEDs, adaptive
response can be realized through messaging the transition and accordingly triggering
setting group changes in the relevant IEDs in the microgrid. IEC 61850 presents
a very well tailored solution to this kind of communication between IEDs in the
form of GOOSE messages discussed in Section 4.3.4. In the following case study
these GOOSE messages are used to adapt the protection settings of a DER unit
protection IED to demonstrate the implementation of adaptive protection using the
new protection system in the Multipower environment.
5.2.1 Test system and desired operation
This case study considers a lightweight test microgrid system consisting of a 11 kW
engine-generator set and a 9 kW resistive heating load installed in the turbine hall
as shown in Figure 5.2. The goal of the study is verifying the islanding capability
of the turbine hall part of the Multipower test environment, and implementing a
simple adaptive protection scheme that adjusts the voltage and frequency protec-
tion settings of the IED at the generator according to the connection status of the
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microgrid. The protection scheme is realized using pre-deﬁned setting groups and
GOOSE messages between the IEDs at the PCC of the microgrid (Q02) and the
generator circuit breaker (Q03). Because of the simplicity of this demonstration
using only two IEDs, logic of setting group changes is implemented straight in the
relay application conﬁguration. In the case of more sophisticated scenarios, a logic
processor engine for the whole environment could be implemented in the COM600
grid automation controller using IEC 61131-3 compatible languages as demonstrated
in [45].
Figure 5.2 Single line diagram of the system used in the case study.
The relays have been named as REF615_verkko for the IED at Q02 and
REF615_TL3B for the IED at Q03. The desired operation of the system can be
summarized as follows:
• If the microgrid transitions to island operation, i.e. Q02 is opened,
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REF615_verkko sends information of this to REF615_TL3B
• While in islanded mode, REF615_TL3B changes its voltage and frequency
protection settings to allow for larger deviations from nominal values to main-
tain island operation according to Table 5.1
• If communication between the relays is lost, REF615_TL3B assumes the more
restricting scenario and uses the grid-connected settings.
Table 5.1 Setting groups for voltage and frequency protection of REF615_TL3B.
Protection
function
SG1
(grid-connected)
SG2
(islanded)
f>
51 Hz
0,2 s
54 Hz
1,3 s
f<
48 Hz
0,2 s
47 Hz
2,9 s
U>
110 %
0,2 s
110 %
2,7 s
U<
85 %
0,2 s
85 %
2,5 s
The settings for grid-connected operation are based on the recommendations of the
Finnish energy industry interest group Energiateollisuus for connecting generation
to the distribution network [101], while island operation parameters are based on
those used in the Hailuoto island microgrid pilot as described in [45].
5.2.2 IEC 61850 model
The relevant IEC 61850 objects of the IEDs in implementing the described scheme
are presented in Figure 5.3. As can be seen, many LNs use the optional preﬁx
and numerical suﬃx in their name as discussed in Section 4.2.1. The REF615
feeder protection IEDs used in this study contain three logical devices: CTRL for
control equipment, DR for the disturbance recorder and LD0 for protection and
other functions. As said, only relevant parts are presented, and some LNs required
by the standard are omitted from the ﬁgure for clarity, including the LPHD logical
node in the CTRL logical device describing the actual physical IED, and the LLN0
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Figure 5.3 The IEC 61850 model of the relevant objects of the case study IEDs, and the
general information ﬂow of the adaptive conﬁguration.
logical node required for each logical device but only shown in the LD0s. The
relevant logical nodes are shortly presented in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 Logical nodes relevant to the implemented protection scheme.
LN Purpose
LLN0 Common logical device information
XCBR Circuit breaker
PTOV Overvoltage protection
PTUV Undervoltage protection
PFRQ Frequency protection
RADR Disturbance recorder analog channel
RBDR Disturbance recorder binary channel
In the sender IED REF615_verkko, position information of the circuit breaker is
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located in the XCBR LN for the circuit breaker. A data set, as presented in Sec-
tion 4.3.2, is created containing this information. Then a GOOSE control block
is created for sending the information in the deﬁned data set to the receiving IED.
Both the data set and the GOOSE control block are located in the LLN0 logical node.
In the receiving relay, the GOOSE message is used by the LN LLN0 to manage the
active setting group for all the protection functions of the LD0 logical device, as
well as in the RBDR LNs in the disturbance recorder logical device DR to trigger
recordings upon changes in received data.
5.2.3 Implementation
The relay conﬁgurations were done using the PCM600 Protection and control IED
manager tool. In PCM600, the IEDs are referenced by their technical keys,
AA1N1Q02A1 for REF615_verkko and AA1N1Q03A1 for REF615_TL3B. The IEC
61850 conﬁguration tool of PCM600 is used to conﬁgure the information exchange.
First, a data set CBpos is deﬁned to LD0 of REF615_verkko containing the posi-
tion information of the circuit breaker Q02, represented by the IEC 61850 object
AA1N1Q02A1.CTRL.CBXCBR1. A general rule for the order of data arrangement in
a data set is the signal to be sent ﬁrst, followed by its quality. Following this the
dataset, shown in Figure 5.4, consists of two entries: the actual value of the position
Pos.stVal and the quality of said value Pos.q.
Figure 5.4 The CBpos data set used in GOOSE communication of the case study.
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Next, a GOOSE control block GCBpos is created, choosing CBpos as its data set and
the LD0 of REF615_TL3B as its subscriber. This makes the data set available to
be used at the receiving IED, as shown in Figure 5.5. Finally, these inputs are then
mapped to a GOOSERCV_INTL function block through the Signal Matrix tool, making
them available in the application conﬁguration as outputs of said function block.
Figure 5.5 Connection of the deﬁned data set to the receiving IED using the GOOSE
control block GCBpos (top) and received inputs at REF615_TL3B (bottom).
To change setting groups at REF615_TL3B according to the GOOSE messages,
the data object LD0.LLN0.LgcSelSG is set to logic mode 1 to allow controlling the
setting groups via binary inputs. As the setting groups are common for all LNs of
the LD0 logical device, they are activated by the LLN0 logical node for common LD
information. The data received in GOOSE messages is then used in the application
conﬁguration to determine the used setting group as shown in Figure 5.6. The
GOOSE quality can be used to monitor the communication network between the
IEDs: as explained in Section 4.3.4, GOOSE messages are sent periodically with
a longer cycle time in addition to immediate transmission upon value changes. If
a message doesn't arrive within this cycle time, the quality of the GOOSE signal
5.3. Test results 84
changes to invalid, and the communication failure can be detected. Therefore both
proper position information and validity of this information is required for activation
of setting group 2. As soon as the binary input BI_SG_2 changes back to 0, setting
group 1 is reactivated.
Figure 5.6 Setting group selection using the received GOOSE messages at
REF615_TL3B.
For triggering the disturbance recorder to record GOOSE related events, the position
information is also connected to the binary input 41 in the disturbance recorder of
the IED (DR.RBDR41) as shown in Figure 5.3 to trigger a recording when Q02 opens.
In the same way the quality value is connected to DR.RBDR42 to trigger a recording
if the information quality changes to invalid.
5.3 Test results
The behaviour of implemented protection scheme was tested for two cases: island-
ing of the microgrid and communication failure between IEDs. At the beginning of
the islanding test both breakers Q02 and Q03 were closed, so the diesel-generator
set was running in parallel with the distribution network. Then breaker Q02 was
manually opened, corresponding to disconnection command issued to the PCC. Sys-
tem behaviour was monitored through the disturbance recorder of REF615_TL3B.
Figure 5.7 shows the record of the setting group change during islanding in the
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winwave32 program. The activation of the "Q02 open" signal marks the moment
the message is received through GOOSE at TL3B, and so the setting group is im-
mediately changed. The actual delay between sending of the GOOSE message at
REF615_verkko and the change of setting group at REF615_TL3B was measured
over ten test runs. With the 1600 Hz sampling frequency corresponding to a time
resolution of 0,625 ms, the delay varied between 2,500 and 6,875 ms with an average
delay of 4,4 ms. It can also be noticed that after the CB opening the overvoltage
protection function PHPTOV1 was brieﬂy started, but maintained the deﬁned pick-up
value for less than 50 ms. The frequency response of the system is presented in
Figure 5.8. The islanding transient results in a frequency minimum of 48,4 Hz, and
while the disturbance record lasts for only 5000 ms, frequency eventually stabilized
at 49,4 Hz.
Figure 5.7 Setting group change to SG2 during islanding.
Communication failure was tested by disconnecting the Ethernet cable of
REF615_TL3B while setting group 2 was active. As can be seen from Figure
5.9, when the IED detects the invalid GOOSE quality the active setting group is
changed back to SG1. The maximum delay in detecting the loss of communication is
determined by the setting MaxTime of the GOOSE control block in REF615_verkko,
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Figure 5.8 Frequency response of the test system during islanding.
which deﬁnes the periodic retransmission cycle time, often termed the heartbeat cy-
cle, for its data set [102]. The value used in this conﬁguration was 10000 ms, and
represents the worst case delay for communication failure detection. Smaller values
will result in faster detection, but will also increase traﬃc in the communication
network. While deﬁnitely not limiting in this test case between just two IEDs, this
is a potential problem to be considered with wide conﬁgurations of large amounts
of IEDs whether inside substations or in a larger microgrid conﬁguration.
Figure 5.9 Setting group change back to SG1 after communication failure indicated by
GOOSE quality.
5.4 Suggestions on further research
In this chapter the capability of the new IEC 61850 based protection system to
implement adaptive protection was demonstrated. Potential future work with the
protection system includes:
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• complementing the protection scheme to a complete microgrid solution with
more complex operation and coordination with multiple IEDs including pos-
sibly conﬂicting scenarios
• testing of the grid emulator CINERGIA GE30 in introducing actual faults to
the feeding network, and islanding under these fault conditions
• protection coordination with several DER units with diﬀerent characteristics
such as directly connected and converter based DG units with diﬀerent fault
current feeding capabilities
• operation of parallel inverters with diﬀerent control and protection functions
• introducing controllable loads to the network and potentially using load shed-
ding as part of the islanding routine when islanding under heavy load
• studying the usage of other networks for communication, such as using a 4G
Long-Term Evolution (LTE) network for GOOSE messaging
For additional components, the incorporation of other related VTT research areas
such as fuel cells and electrical vehicle (EV) charging stations would bring major
new elements to the system. As for IEC 61850 speciﬁc research, and extending the
scope of usage in the environment, the environmental measurements of the micro-
PV system to be installed could be converted to IEC 61850 based data such as the
logical node MMET for meteorological information, and distributed further using
IEC 61850. The new DER units such as a fuel cell could be interfaced with an
appropriate IED and modeled using the new LNs introduced in IEC 61850-7-420,
studying the completeness and suitability of the extension. A natural extension
would also be introducing multi-vendor IEDs to the environment, testing the current
interoperability capabilities of the standard series.
The scope of research could also be extended to cover interoperability between dif-
ferent smart grid standards. The COM600 grid automation controller is planned
to be used for connections outside the environment network, and could serve as
a testing platform for the harmonization of IEC 61850 and other used smart grid
standards like the Common Information Model (CIM). Similarly, translation of the
IEC 62056 Companion Speciﬁcation for Energy Metering (COSEM) object model to
the IEC 61850 data model is currently in Draft Technical Speciﬁcation (DTS) stage,
as a proposed extension IEC 61850-80-4. If a smart meter was installed to loads
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connected to the environment, the interoperability of these two standards could also
be examined.
89
6. CONCLUSIONS
Increasing use of renewable energy sources, penetration of distributed energy re-
sources in the distribution network, and stricter requirements of the security, reli-
ability and quality of electricity supply are driving a change in existing electricity
grids from passive networks to active smart grids. Microgrids, deﬁned as part of
the smart distribution grid with capability of island operation, are envisioned as
one of the promising concepts in supporting the goals of future power systems. In
addition to the physical network equipment and a combination of distributed energy
resources (DER), an advanced control and monitoring system capable of managing
the microgrid as a whole and extending DMS-like functionality to the lower levels
of the distribution network is a main component in realizing the microgrid concept.
To successfully transition into island operation after an utility network fault, the
separation of the microgrid must be fast enough to maintain stability inside the
microgrid after islanding. The required speed is determined by the type and charac-
teristics of DER units in the microgrid as well as sensitivity of customer loads such
as induction motors. Resynchronization back to the utility grid must be done with
suﬃciently small voltage, frequency and phase angle deviations to prevent system
oscillations after reconnection. Special attention must be paid to control methods
for voltage and frequency that diﬀer from traditional systems and vary according to
the operation principles of DER units in the microgrid.
Main protection issues regarding microgrids are adverse eﬀects of DER units on
fault currents and reclosing, greatly reduced fault current feed-in capabilities of
power electronic interfaced DER units compared to directly connected units, change
of operation conditions between islanded and grid-connected modes, changing grid
conﬁgurations, unwanted operation of DER anti-islanding protection and potential
earth fault detection problems at DER units. Some form of adaptive protection,
i.e. modifying the response of the protection system according to power system
conditions, is deemed necessary to cope with these challenges.
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The IEC 61850 series oﬀers a wide standardization of information models and data
ﬂow in power utility automation systems as well as associated management and
engineering processes, with interoperability, extendability and support for future
technologies embedded in design. Originally designed for substation automation, the
standard has been extended to other areas such as hydro power, power converters
and distributed energy resources, and has potential to be applied widely in the
distribution network. An adpative protection scheme for VTT's Multipower test
environment using IEC 61850 was realized by using the freely conﬁgurable, fast
GOOSE messages of the standard to initiate predeﬁned setting group changes in
protection IEDs in a simple test conﬁguration of an islanding microgrid. Capability
of islanding and the correct operation of the implemented protection scheme was
demonstrated.
Potential future work includes more sophisticated scenarios with generation units
and energy storages of diﬀerent characteristics, studying system behaviour under
utility grid faults using the grid emulator to inject disturbances, and introducing
controllable loads to the system, potentially to be used as part of the islanding rou-
tine. Other research possibilities in the Multipower environment include examining
the use and applicability of diﬀerent networks such as LTE for protection functions,
incorporation of other VTT research areas such as fuel cells and electric vehicles in
to the system and extending the environment to a testing platform for the ongoing
harmonization of IEC 61850 and other smart grid standards such as CIM and IEC
62056.
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